States have many functions. The core one should be keeping its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Diplomacy and international law cannot guarantee their security. An armed force is an inherent part of each state that wants to be truly independent. Small states and middle powers have more difficulties when recruiting manpower for the military service compared to the great powers. The aim of this article is to find out what kind of recruitment model is the most suitable for small states and middle powers, focusing on the example of European democratic states. The article concludes that the best military recruitment system is based on a strong link between armed forces and society. National defence education is also of high importance. Regular armed forces should be composed of highly trained professionals backed by reserves.

Keywords: Small states, middle powers, military recruitment, military conscription, all-volunteer force, armed forces, state

Keywords: Estados pequeños, potencias medias, reclutamiento militar, servicio militar obligatorio, fuerza de voluntarios, fuerzas armadas, Estado.

Abstract

Título en Castellano: El modelo de reclutamiento militar para las fuerzas armadas de pequeños Estados y potencias medias. El ejemplo europeo.

Resumen:

Palabras Clave: Estados pequeños, potencias medias, reclutamiento militar, servicio militar obligatorio, fuerza de voluntarios, fuerzas armadas, Estado.

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1. Introduction

In the contemporary world, states continue to be the main actors in international relations. All the states have different characteristics and it is not possible to find two states that would act identically. Each state needs to exercise specific functions; otherwise, it would disappear or work ineffectively. As Kulašík stated, there are many criteria for defining the functions of a state. The traditional division between internal and external functions is based on the territorial characteristics of a state and on the range of activities that state bodies execute. Among internal functions, he mentions protective (based on safeguarding the political order, security of citizens, and rights of citizens), regulatory (state's application of orders and restrictions); cultural-educational (based on creation and spreading of political, philosophical and moral opinions among citizens); adaptive (based on states effort to keep up with the international progress), and socioeconomic (based on public finance). External functions of a state are inevitable because many states with different cultures exist in the international system and they have established mutual relations. A state tries to protect its interests, mainly its territorial integrity against external aggression. Therefore, a state has three basic external functions: defensive, offensive, and preservation of status quo.

States also differ in size and resources, which crucially determines their position and ability to enforce their interests in the international environment. In this regard, Bluntschli writes that it is impossible to say what the normal size of the population is. For example, in the middle ages it was possible for small states to exist and provide security for its citizens. As the evolution of state's functions and political duties continued, it was inevitable for a state to become larger. Another important factor contributing to continuous growth of a state is the existence of the great powers. The great powers in the contemporary world are usually so large, with so many resources, and have such a large population that they become a danger to the very existence of small states.

As already mentioned, a state has to be able to exercise certain functions, but it seems obvious that the most important one is to sustain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. An armed force is an inherent part of a state that wants to be truly independent. For the great powers, it is not difficult to recruit enough manpower to build up armed forces because they have greater population and resources than small states and middle powers. Thus, the decision to build up an all-volunteer force or to use a draft as the main recruitment model is not so crucial.

The main aim of this article is to find out what kind of recruitment model is the most suitable for small states and middle powers. Is it recruitment based on the labour market or based on a compulsory military service? To illustrate major points, the authors chose the example of European democratic states. It is almost certain that similar models would also be the most appropriate in less democratic states. However, democratic states tend to act similarly and thus there is more space for generalization when trying to find the best solution for a military recruitment.

From a methodological point of view, this article is based on two main pillars: the middle power theory applied in the geopolitical area of Europe and a wide range of theories regarding military recruitment and its effects. In the first part of the article, we try to develop...
the most suitable model for classification of states according to their power. We cite the works of theorists such as Adam Chapnick and Anton Bezglasnyy who both tried to systematically approach the middle power theory, and Carsten Holbraad who stated that any given list of middle powers would be just an approximation and that measurable indicators of states' power has to be defined. Considering military recruitment theory, there are numerous authors cited in this article. Milton Friedman and Walter Oi write about economic inefficiency of compulsory military service in peacetime. Many other authors like Daniel DellaPosta or Joshua Angrist write about the effect of military service on later civil earnings of veterans. In addition, we also review articles that suggest the best military praxis in the contemporary world considering civil-military relations. Morris Janowitz writes about the inequity of selective inductions. Christopher Dandeker stresses the importance of the reserve component in the military. The application of theoretical knowledge and power division of the states taking Europe as an example is mainly based on current social and security problems of the region considering all theories mentioned in this article.

2. Middle powers theory

In this article, it is essential to separate middle powers and small states from other states' divisions depending on the state power. The main question is which method to use to draw the top and bottom line for the distinction of the middle powers. Another very relevant question is in how many tiers the states should be divided according to power. In this chapter, we present the most useful method to identify middle powers in a sense that is coherent with the main aim of this article: To find out what kind of recruitment model is the most suitable for small states and middle powers. This model is an attempt to contribute to the debate on middle powers theory focusing on the military.

The literature on middle power theory is not unified. It names different attributes crucial for a state to become a middle power. Chapnick introduces a division of literature on the middle power theory according to three main approaches: functional, behavioural and hierarchical models. Each of these models perceives a middle power in a different way. The differences are quite substantial, to the extent that a middle power defined according to one of the models would be a minor power according to another, and vice versa. The functional model stresses the ability of a state classified as middle power to significantly influence some of the key areas of international relations. The level of influence of these states in specific areas must be higher than the influence of other states. Thus, great powers are states that enjoy permanent influence in international relations, while middle powers have only temporary influence in specific areas. An essential flaw of this model is that it cannot differentiate between small powers and middle powers. It is almost impossible to predict which of the middle powers will gain influence in specific areas and which one will never gain it. According to the behavioural model, all states that act in a certain manner should be classified as middle powers. Chapnick labelled this behaviour as middle power internationalism. It is a behaviour different not only from that of the great powers, but from the small ones as well. According to the author, the model does not provide a method to identify middle powers because the characteristics of the required behaviour differ across the literature. Another reason is that most of the authors first choose the states they consider middle powers and later they use their features as those that should characterize middle powers. The hierarchical model recognizes the great power on one hand and the small on the other. The first category consists of states that are most powerful regarding their capabilities; small powers have very limited capabilities and middle powers emerge as the tier in between the two. They have better capabilities than small states but cannot reach the capabilities of the great powers. The author writes that this model is the most objective because
it is able to distinguish the small states from the great powers and define middle powers in relation to the other two tiers.

Bezglasnyy presents a division of middle power theories according to two schools: classical and revisionist. The first emerged in the time of the Cold War. It emphasizes the material status of states. When creating a rank of states, structural factors are of main importance. Among these factors, the author mentions the size of the population, territory, economic efficiency, and capabilities of the state power. As we can see, the classical school of middle power theory is consistent with Chapnick's hierarchical model. The revisionist school, on the other hand, is another name for the Chapnick's behavioural model. Finally, Bezglasnyy presents its own model for designation of the middle powers. He uses observations from the constructivist school to create the middle power concept that would eliminate flaws in the existing ones. His concept is based on a combination of material, behavioural and ideational factors. The middle power is a state that materializes three conditions: it is middle-sized and disposes of mid-range capabilities; in foreign policy, it is prone to multilateralism and it uses soft power to maximize positive outcomes; it identifies itself as a middle power in state politics and international relations.

For the purpose of this article, we consider the hierarchical model the most appropriate. Since we intend to find out what kind of armed forces model is the most suitable for middle and small powers, structural factors are of the greatest importance.

One of such models is presented in Holbraad's publication “Middle powers in international politics”. First, the author presents the most important differences between the great and middle powers. He offers a set of qualities that great powers have and the middle powers lack. The great powers not only have high military and economic capabilities, but they also enjoy a special position in the international relations system. Their power is guaranteed by international law. The great powers share certain interests and act as managers of international relations. They try to preserve their position in the state-to-state relations and thus they cooperate in certain tasks.

In this article, we agree with Holbraad that the power of states cannot be measured precisely and accurately. Thus, any list of middle powers is based on approximation. The author states that the best indicator to define middle powers is the gross national product (GNP). GNP stands for power in material factors like area, population, resources, location and in moral factors like organization and leadership as well. When measuring the power of a state it is also appropriate to combine it with other factors such as population. Trying to find upper and lower dividing lines might cause many difficulties. The more desirable method is to divide the world into separate regions in which states are bound together with closer ties. The states are classified in a world divided in six regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North, and Central America, South America, and Oceania and Indonesia.

For the purposes of this article, we adopt Holbraad's geographical division into regions and we also use indicators that are widely accessible. Instead of GNP, we decided to use a more

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7 Bezglasnyy, Anton: “Middle power theory, change and continuity in the Asia-Pacific”, A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of arts, the University of British Columbia Vancouver, (2010), pp. 17-22.
9 Ibid., p. 78.
precise indicator, the gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates (GDP, PPP)\(^{10}\) as suggested by Bezglasnyy in his thesis. This indicator shows the real wealth of a country in terms of providing manpower for an army.

To finalize the division of states according to power, one must decide how many tiers to consider. Bluntschli divides states into four tiers. The world powers are those most powerful, usually maritime powers, so their power is applied in more than one continent or even worldwide. Usually, they preserve world peace and world order. The second tier is represented by great powers, which are strong enough to exert their power only regionally. Intermediate and peaceful powers are unable to push their foreign interests ahead; thus, they concentrate on domestic politics. They mitigate tensions in international politics. Real petty states are those too weak to exist alone so, in order to perpetuate their existence, they seek the protection of other states\(^{11}\). Krejčí presents a power pyramid of the world political system. On the top of the pyramid, there is a hegemon, followed by the superpowers, the great powers, middle and small states, and colonies. He also mentions microstates, states that have less than a million citizens. Krejčí argues that the lower great powers are those powers with no second-strike capability; however, the sheer quantity of their nuclear weapons arsenal deter all potential rivals. He also argues that these powers are sometimes called middle powers\(^{12}\). Bezglasnyy uses another division of powers: super/great powers; major powers; medium powers and small ones\(^{13}\). Other authors like Holbraad\(^{14}\) and Lee\(^{15}\) apply just three-tier division: great, middle, and small powers.

In this article, it seems most suitable to apply a four-tier division based on GDP, PPP and the size of the population\(^{16}\). To make the estimation of the state power more precise we decided to apply one more indicator: The Global Firepower index\(^{17}\). In cases where it is difficult to draw the line between tiers, the Global Firepower indicator proves helpful to differentiate them. The division of states according to only three chosen indicators is insufficient for making a clear and accurate division for the purposes of this article. Indicators will just reveal a crude division, which needs to be further specified by considering additional available information.

The great powers are the strongest states in terms of chosen indicators. Major powers are those states which are more powerful than middle powers but fall behind the great powers. Their position in international relations is often conditioned by their history.\(^{18}\) Some of them might be the former great powers on the decline. Middle powers are the states on the top of

\(^{10}\) All information on PPP available at GDP, PPP (current international $), at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD; All data we used were retrieved from World Development Indicators, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

\(^{11}\) See Bluntschli, op. cit., p. 263.


\(^{13}\) See Bezglasnyy, op. cit., pp. 17-22.

\(^{14}\) See Holbraad, op. cit.


\(^{16}\) All data we used were retrieved from Countries in the world by population (2017), at http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/

\(^{17}\) Global Firepower Index is based on more than 50 factors. It estimates the power of the country. Evaluation of nation’s arms is not just according to crude numbers thus smaller but technologically more developed countries may score higher. Complete methodology available at: Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2017), at http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.

small states, not powerful enough to be qualified as major powers but significantly stronger than the vast majority of the small states. All other countries are considered small states or too small to be granted any power status.

In this article, the authors decided to apply the theory of military recruitment in relation to selected European states. After evaluating the data, the Russian Federation seems to be the only great power in this region. Although Russia has been denied this status after its defeat in the Cold War, the authors still consider this country to be the strongest within the European region. Furthermore, it has a great influence in Asia as well. This choice is also backed by its permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). According to The Global Firepower Index, Russia has the second strongest military in the world. It is also undeniable that the country has one of the biggest arsenals of nuclear weapons and it has a second-strike capability, definitely granting it the status of the great power at least in terms of military strength. Three major powers were identified: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Great Britain. Both France and Great Britain are permanent members of UNSC. Both countries have a nuclear arsenal at their disposal. All these three countries are in top 10 of the most powerful economies of the world according to GDP, PPP. France and Germany are founding states of the European Union and both are the principal leaders.

Within the European space, the most difficult thing was to draw a line between major and middle powers. Italy is the twelfth strongest state according to GDP, PPP. It has only slightly fewer inhabitants than France and only a bit worse performance in military terms than Germany, according to The Global Firepower Index. The choice was made mainly taking into account two considerations: Italy has been in economic crisis for a longer period. The banking system is not working properly, the debt rate is high, and the level of corruption is high as well. The country is further weakened by the continuous migration crisis; in fact, Italy and Greece are two European Union states that face the most significant influx of illegal migrants. Therefore, Italy is the first of the middle powers in Europe. Other data suggest that there are two more middle powers in Europe. One is Poland and the other one is Spain. Netherlands have sufficiently high GDP, PPP to be considered a middle power, but it has insufficient population. Ukraine represents the opposite example. It has sufficiently high population; nevertheless, the level of GDP, PPP is insufficient, and the country is currently in political crisis. Furthermore, its ongoing conflict with the Russian Federation has weakened the country as well as its middle power potential.

3. Military recruitment theory

In order to find out which recruitment system, whether voluntary or compulsory, is the most efficient for small states and middle powers, we have to explore already theories developed and available on this topic. The first “recent” wave of the literature dealing with conscription-based armed forces or all-volunteer force started after the Second World War in the United States.

Numerous scholarly articles were written on many different aspects of military service. There was a basic discussion naming pros and cons of each of the systems mainly based on the opinion of authors. Another widely explored issue is the economic efficiency of conscription. In this respect, some authors write about the effects of compulsory military service on later

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19 Das, Satyajit: “Why Italy’s economy is about to collapse”, The Independent, 20 June 2016.
20 Baczynska, Gabriela: “Arrivals to Italy now main concern of migration crisis, says EU border guard”, The Independent, 12 October 2016.
earnings of veterans in the civilian labour market. There are also papers discussing social and cultural effects of compulsory military service.

In the contemporary world, economic considerations combined with political stability and peaceful relations with other states would reasonably represent the top priority of every rational actor. Therefore, we assume that each of small states and middle powers has to consider the economy as one of the top priorities when deciding which staffing system the armed forces have to use. This assumption should be valid in those states that view the welfare of its population as the cornerstone of all activities.\(^{21}\) When Friedman wrote about the choice between conscription and all-volunteer force he stated that all-volunteer force might be even cheaper than the one based on conscription. He did not use a complex methodology based on calculations, like most of the authors dealing with the economy of military service; he rather used simple logic combined with professional insight. He based his assumption on the following propositions: Even though the price of one soldier in conscripted force is lower, one has to add the value of the foregone opportunity. All conscripts could work somewhere else, thus to know the real price of one conscript we have to add the value of the difference between what he earns in the army and what he could earn in a civilian job. Furthermore, there are additional savings in all-volunteer force connected with lower turnover. Fewer soldiers have to be trained and due to higher professionalism, a lesser number of soldiers in the military is required. When states apply a system of conscription, conscripts usually occupy places, which could be occupied by civilians. Additionally, universities are consequently overcrowded with people who study just to get a deferment. Otherwise, they could work in civilian jobs. According to Friedman, all voluntary force is economically superior. The only period when it loses its prime is in a period of war or armed conflict when attracting the individual into armed forces becomes overwhelmingly expensive\(^{22}\).

Very similar reasoning might be found in the article from Oi. He discusses the period of transition from conscript to an all-volunteer force. It would need a drastic rise of military payments, 98% in a transition period and later around 68%. Oi stresses the fact that in the peace time, a recruit might wait up to seven and half year for conscription to take place. This results in uncertainty and insufficient economic performance of an individual.\(^{23}\)

More recently, Poutvaara and Wagener in their work on the economics of military service argue in favour of all-volunteer force. They believe that military recruitment system using coercion in form of compulsory military service distorts human capital accumulation. It combines restriction on the free use of time with 100% tax in kind for a certain period of time. Furthermore, it forces young people to work before their education is finalized. According to Poutvaara and Wagener, introduction of compulsory military service is not a desirable solution. In case that all-volunteer system is introduced, the best way to do it is by the means of Pareto improvement, i.e. avoid double-taxation. To ensure a balanced and equal approach, only the members of younger generation are to be subject to taxation. Otherwise, the older generation would be double-taxed (once in form of compulsory military service, and secondly in form of taxes to fund professional all-volunteer armed forces). The opposite situation, i.e. the introduction of compulsory draft, would prove advantageous only for the older generations that

\(^{21}\) It is hard to assume the real importance of economic considerations in autocratic regimes or dictatorships, where welfare of few is the top priority. In autocratic states policy making process might be irrational, perpetuating the power position of current leadership.


did not serve previously and would not be subject to subscription due to their age. At the same time would not need to contribute to an all-volunteer armed force via taxation.\textsuperscript{24}

Koch and Birchenall wrote a paper that contrast with most of the works dealing with a military service issue. There seems to be a rare agreement between the scholars that, after a certain threshold of soldiers necessary to be recruited is surpassed,\textsuperscript{25} compulsory military service becomes more convenient. Koch and Birchenall, on the other hand, argue that the more soldiers need to be recruited (i.e. the more soldiers are needed for the armed service purposes), the less convenient compulsory military service becomes. Their proposition is explained on the basis of fewer individuals in civilian jobs who would normally earn a higher salary\textsuperscript{26} and thus return more to the economy. It is caused by random induction that is applied within the draft in contrast to the voluntary enlistment into an all-volunteer force\textsuperscript{27}.

To illustrate the efficiency of the draft in times of war or in the event of large standing army we may cite the work of Garfinkel. One of the conclusions of his research is that compulsory military service becomes an optimal fiscal policy for the state only when the productivity loss equals to zero. If the draft is introduced during the war, it helps to reduce taxation and impedes debt creation. Consequently, it reduces the financial burden on the state both during the war and after it ends\textsuperscript{28}.

Almost the same conclusion can be found in Siu's article. He assesses the effect of compulsory military service as an optimal fiscal policy during the Second World War as a fiscal shock absorber. The final estimation is that compulsory military service is 1.2\% to 2\% more suitable comparing to all-volunteer force when used optimally to absorb the fiscal shock during great wars\textsuperscript{29}.

Lee and McKenzie propose another example of the same phenomenon. They explain that if a given threshold is exceeded, compulsory military service becomes a cheaper alternative to the all-volunteer armed forces. This is due to deadweight loss caused by taxation to cover costs of an all-volunteer force. They argue that if more than 55-61\% of the population subject to (compulsory) recruitment is required to serve in the armed forces, compulsory military service becomes economically more viable and an efficient alternative to all-volunteer military service.\textsuperscript{30}

In his article, Ross lays down a question: ‘Can we provide a model of the choice between voluntarism and conscription that will explain the actual choices nations have made in the past and continue to make today?’ The author is of an opinion that the main determinant of the choice between these two models is the price. He agrees with most of the authors that the higher


\textsuperscript{25} Usually when there is a need of mass army, or at least of a high portion of population.

\textsuperscript{26} The tax base under conditions of voluntary enlistment is more productive than one under conditions of compulsory military service.


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the portion of military eligible is needed to serve, the more lucrative compulsory military service becomes. And a compulsory military service becomes more efficient after crossing the threshold of 25 soldiers per thousand citizens. The five most important determinants of the choice mentioned in the article are: the size of armed forces; the available finances in the state budget; income distribution; marginal deadweight loss caused by taxation; the state of war.

Warner and Negrusa evaluated the efficiency of the systems. They add the cost of prevention of evasions into their calculations and write that when there is no need for a large army, the all-volunteer force is cheaper and better suited for current military tasks. They offer a similar conclusion as Ross: for a country where the efficiency of collecting taxes is weaker, compulsory military service is preferable to all-volunteer force.

After examining the economic theory of military service, we can extract some conclusions:

- Most of the theories stress the relationship between opportunity costs caused by conscription and deadweight tax loss, which is higher when applying a system of voluntary enlistment. In peacetime, all-volunteer force is preferable. During the war or other periods, which require huge portion of the population to serve, compulsory military service becomes more economically viable.
- Countries, in which economy is not working properly, specifically their tax systems, might prefer the compulsory military service due to higher tax distortion.
- Except for emergencies like war or armed conflict or the one we mentioned in point number two, it is never viable to introduce compulsory military service. It costs more and there are additional costs connected with its suspension. The reason why all-volunteer force is superior is the lower turnover of soldiers in armed forces and professionalization: people can choose where they want to work and thus they produce greater income for the state budget.

However, it should never be forgotten that choosing the recruitment system always depends on the government, and therefore the political decision is always the final determinant.

Economists did not only deal with the effect of different models of military service on state's economy. There is also wide discussion on the effect of compulsory military service on later earnings of individuals in the civil labour market. Articles on this topic deal with lifetime earnings of conscripts compared to the earnings of individuals that have never been drafted. De Tray in his article argues that veterans (i.e. individuals with military service experience) have higher wages compared to nonveterans. He is, however, sceptical about the cause of these differences. There are two explanations. One explains that higher wages of veterans are due to the skills gained in the military. Another explanation is that completion of compulsory military service serves later employers as a screening device. The ability of a person to complete military service proves ones' mental health (a certain level of intelligence); physical health; physical fitness; and good behaviour and performance. The results of his research were not completely

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Later after running his model to test effect of certain factors on introduction of a compulsory military service, he found out that war is statistically insignificant. Though, he writes it might be caused by low extent of countries in the war.
33 Each person before being conscripted has to pass tests proving its physical and mental fitness. To complete military course person has to prove good behaviour and performance.
unambiguous; however, he stressed that veteran status should serve as a valuable screening device. His research also suggests that black draftees and draftees with less than 12 years of formal education received higher wages in their civil employment compared to the individuals from the same social group, which did not serve in the military.34

Berger and Hirsch studied the Vietnam-era conscription, 1968-1977, and its effect on civilian earnings of former conscripts. Their research reveals only a slight difference between veterans and nonveterans. They share De Tray's conclusions regarding the benefits of those with less than 12 years of schooling. They also find out that earnings of veterans are lower in an initial phase, but in a later phase of their career they tend to be more pronounced.35

Angrist found the opposite effect of military conscription on those who served. He writes that there were ambiguous results considering the effect of military service on later civilian earning. This was probably caused by ignoring the fact that there are individuals with higher propensity to serve than others36. He writes that his article is trying to avoid this mistake by choosing the Vietnam-era lottery for his research. He finds out that 10 years after being dismissed from service, veterans earn 15% less than nonveterans. This finding to a certain extent correlates with De Tray's findings regarding the initial lower incomes of veterans. He supposes that veterans might earn less due to their lack of experience in the civil market37.

On the other hand, Grenet, Hart and Roberts found no effects of the military training on later civilian earnings. This research paper was based on data provided by the British National Service from 1949-60. The authors attribute the reason of no reduction in earnings of the veterans to the fact that compulsory military service provided some skills and opportunities such as linking people with different economic, social, educational, and geographical background; cooperation in the team; and geographical mobility38.

Bauer, Bender, Paloyo, and Schmidt explored labour-market effects of compulsory military service on the example of Germany's 1950s draft. They found out that those who served gained a bonus of around 12%. However, after considering selection bias39, no bonus for veterans could be proved. Nevertheless, authors stress that their research cannot be generalized.40

Lee chose the older case of American Civil War for his research of later earnings of conscripts. He found a positive effect of military service on geographical mobility as well. Overall, there was a better economic and geographical mobility of veterans compared to nonveterans. Nevertheless, no deep effect on later earnings was found.41

36 Those who have lower opportunity to find themselves a good civilian job.
39 Only people with no criminal record, healthy, and with certain level of intellect were admitted as draftees.
Card and Cardoso made research on this topic on an example of a man born in Portugal in 1967. To compare veterans and nonveterans, they used wages of the veterans before the conscription took place. Results are similar to those of Berger and Hirsch. When comparing veterans and nonveterans with higher education there were almost no differences. Those veterans with lower education gained 4-5% compared with nonveterans. Interesting fact resulting from this article is that wages of veterans equal those of nonveterans after approximately 6-7 years\(^{42}\).

DellaPosta writes that the only common feature of various studies on later earnings of veterans is that they differ from case to case. His research is based on Wisconsin longitudinal study. He concludes that there were no economic gains for most of the veterans. Only those individuals with a high propensity to serve gained from military service.\(^{43}\)

To make conclusions about long time earning effect of those who completed military service, it is important to say that there is no generalization regarding this issue. The most probable cause is the use of different methodologies and inability to fully simulate the difficult world of economic and social relations.

The economic theory of military service speaks clearly. For the majority of the states it is more suitable to have an all-volunteer force than one largely based on compulsory military service. However, there are other important factors, apart from the economy, to be considered. Needless to say, the military serves all people in the country of their origin. It is an institution created by the state to protect it from mostly military threats. Society in countries where professional all-volunteer based military was established loses touch with the military. There is usually only a small portion of society in all-volunteer armed forces. To keep the link between society and military, different practices were developed. Although some exist only in theory, some are the part of military praxis already for a long period.

Holborn writes about differences in praxis and understanding of compulsory military service in France, Prussia (later Germany), and United States of America. Countries rarely applied a system of universal conscription because it could endanger the monarchic regime. Nobility was always somehow excluded or got a preferential treatment in order to back the monarchy. In Prussia, universal conscription was part of the liberal ideas that were later hindered, and citizens became subjects again. Conscription was still applied but only as a mean of cheap recruitment. That means conscription can be democratic, based on the civil duty of a citizen, but it can be also a system of compulsion that grants subjects no rights at all. On the other hand, a professional army is excluded from society and it might become an ideological and political opposition to the government. The Weimar Republic serves as a good example, as its professional army became the source of the anti-republic sentiment. In the United States, professional armed forces were traditionally understood as the most appropriate. Americans were scared of having a huge army in peacetime. They considered it a risk for the regime. According to Holborn, the best composition of armed forces, at least for the United States, should be based on a reserve component manned by conscription, and professional skeleton. Given the fact that mobilization requires longer time to take effect, there should be volunteers


\(^{43}\) DellaPosta, Daniel J. “The heterogeneous economic returns to military service: Evidence from the Wisconsin longitudinal study”, *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, Vol. 34 (December 2013), pp. 73-95.
that would represent high readiness part of the reserve. Conscripts should earn more, be provided with a better accommodation, and there should be a change in the discipline as well.⁴⁴

Janowitz envisages different models of armed forces suitable for the United States. He emphasizes that selective inductions are far from being equitable. Conscription is rarely conducted universally because armed forces cannot conscript each individual eligible for military service. Thus, a conscription puts an excessive burden on lower classes of society. Lower classes usually also get a worse position in armed forces. On the other hand, if the requirements for a service are too high, lower classes might be excluded. He offers three concepts of who should serve to make the system of recruitment as equitable as feasible, and at the same time, the most appropriate for the state as well. According to his theory, National Service represents the best solution. National Service should be based on three possibilities: One may decide to enlist voluntarily, to wait if he is conscripted and choose alternative service in case he would not be conscripted, or to ask for an exemption on basis of conscientious objection. Volunteers would serve right after reaching the age of 19. Others would be conscripted by means of lottery or would be expected to fulfil the alternative service until the age of 26. Those not eligible to serve in the military should have a possibility to join National Job Training Corps to bolster their skills. The author thinks that civilian control of armed forces is insufficient. Armed forces should have a direct link with society.⁴⁵

Dandeker tries to recommend the best model for the military in democratic societies. First, he puts an army into a context of the contemporary world, which ceased to be bipolar after the end of Cold War. After bipolarity, however, there is a high level of uncertainty. Another feature is globalization. National states are contested both from outside and within the state. In addition, the very sovereignty of the state is contested. It is not clear whether it can protect its citizens from threats that have global dimension. The world became multi-centric and multipolar, so the security policy is shaped in cooperation with corporations, media, NGOs, and other pressure groups. Through the media, public opinion can reach the political effect. According to this description of the current world, the task of the armed forces is to protect the territory even if there is no threat; protect its country and allies against main external threats; and present security interest of the state through the lens of peace and stability. Given these conditions, the most genuine armed force is all-volunteer force based on a reserve component. The professional core of the army should be much narrower than during the Cold War. In case of a need, the military industry must be ready to produce the necessary capacities. There is a higher possibility of using reserves in military operations. In agreement with Janowitz, Dandeker writes that part of the reserve should be in a state of higher readiness. Finance in the military should be spent effectively like in private businesses. Given the current changes in the armed forces taking place in the world, militaries will need to spend more financial resources on improving the public relations, as they can no longer remain distanced from the society. Military personnel will need to gain skills from political management and officers will be required to gain political as well as diplomatic skills.⁴⁶

Military reserves and a revised model of citizen soldier for the United States are core issues in the article from Moskos. The US lead operations like Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom caused excessive use of military reserves. The professional core of the US armed forces was not broad enough to sustain these operations for an adequate time. Moskos considers that there should be no such excessive use of reserves. He presents a model of short-term citizen soldier that would serve for 15 months. Enlistees should be recruited from colleges. Service should allow them to pay their debt for education and grant the special advantages considering education and general welfare. They should help to reduce the number of reservists serving abroad. The effect should be visible mainly in peacekeeping operations, but they might also serve in positions that would otherwise be contracted to external firms. The practice would also serve as a link between the armed forces and the society.

Short-term volunteers are also part of the solution for the United States Armed Forces envisaged by O’Hanlon. His proposition to attract soldiers into armed forces is to allow foreign recruitment in exchange of a citizenship granted at a later stage. Apart from providing manpower, soldiers recruited abroad would also help to incorporate citizens of problematic regions into US Armed Forces, possibly improving and strengthening public relations with the regions in question. In situations when there is a lack of recruits, the author also suggests recruiting for specific positions within the armed forces.

According to Crebs, the way of recruitment and the entire military practice should be in line with the society, more precisely with its political culture. Consequently, the draft in the United States is of no use anymore. The all-volunteer force has been established as the product of social changes, not the other way around. Political culture has moved away from militarized republicanism and paved way to liberalism. Crebs believes that people in the United States have lost a touch with each other and the health of the democracy is poor. The remedy to this institutional decay should be promoting a new culture of non-militarized republicanism where civil service would be of high value but not solely understood as the military service. Crebs suggests that national leaders should promote this idea pushed through media, although he acknowledges that it would be a difficult task to accomplish.

For the purposes of this article, it is important to fully comprehend the differences between armed forces and society. It allows to understand why there is a huge need of strong mutual connections between these two separate “worlds” (see Table. 1).

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Table 1. Basic differences between surrounding civil environment of the democratic society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armed forces</th>
<th>Democratic society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Hierarchical, no top-down accountability</td>
<td>Partly-hierarchical with top-down accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Collectivism, obedience, discipline, order, rules, traditions</td>
<td>Individualism, consensus-creation, freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
<td>To win external conflict; to succeed in internal deployment</td>
<td>To reach functional compromise of interests of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
<td>Authoritative, under threat of compulsion</td>
<td>Consensus of the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevailing tendencies in relation: individual - institution</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>The pursuit of individual self-determination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To conclude this section, it is necessary to sum up the presented discourse and to make some general observations. Regarding the economic theories of military recruitment, it is widely accepted that conscription is more expensive than all-volunteer force until certain threshold is crossed. This threshold was set to 25 recruits per-thousand citizens by Ross, and to 55-61% recruited from the entire military-eligible population. The most common situation when there is a high need of military personnel is war. Garfinkel and Siu wrote articles regarding conscription and war. Siu found out that conscription during the Second World War was approximately 1.2 – 2% more suitable than all-volunteer force. Garfinkel stresses the importance of conscription in reducing taxation and creation of debt. Oi deals with a transition period from conscript base military to all-volunteer force. He concludes that during this period there is a need for extra expenses. Poutvaara and Wagener also deal with the transition period. They argue that the only equitable way to build an all-volunteer force from a conscripted one is to do it in a Pareto-improving manner. The lesser efficiency of conscripted force is described through misallocation of labour. The only way to make it more economically efficient is to make specific rules for conscription. There is a need to omit those who have high probability to earn more in the civilian labour market. On the other hand, all-volunteer force becomes more expensive with a high need of military labour because of the distortion created by an enormous taxation. Only Koch and Birchenall disagree with most of the arguments listed above. The model they used during their research suggests that with higher number of citizens needed for military, an all-volunteer force becomes more economically efficient. The more individuals are conscripted, the lesser is the number of citizens left for civilian labour market. We agree with the prevalent opinion and assume that conscription becomes more efficient than all-volunteer force only under circumstances of war or bog conflict. This is, however, valid when only economic theories are considered. Otherwise, there are further factors that might favour conscription.

Another way to assess the economic efficiency of the military recruitment system is to check the effects of the compulsory military training on individuals. First, it is necessary to stress the fact that there is no space for generalization. Nevertheless, some conclusions might be made. According to most of the authors dealing with this topic, there is a positive influence of military service for those with high propensity to serve. The explanation of higher wages is twofold. One of the explanations is that soldiers develop special skillset in military, which in

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51 Friedman, Garfinkel, Lee and McKenzie, Oi, Poutvaara and Wagener, Ross, Siu, Warner and Negrusa.
turn increases their value on labour market. The other explanation is that employers use military service as a specific screening device. To be able to serve in the armed forces, an individual has to pass certain threshold of intelligence, health and skills. There is also an agreement that right after military training, the veterans earn less. After certain period, however, earnings of veterans and non-veterans tend to become similar. Some of the authors like Berger and Hirsch, Grenet et al., Bauer, Bender, Paloyo, and Schmidt write that there is only a slight or no difference between veterans and non-veterans. It seems that the effect of military service on the wealth of veterans is low, non-existent or even negative. Thus, we do not consider conscription a good model regarding the economy and wealth of individuals.

From the point of view of the economy, it seems illogical to implement conscription as a method of military recruitment. By reviewing further the literature on military recruitment, we found out that the most suitable model considering the current security environment is a professional armed force supported by reserves\(^{52}\). Reserves underpin professional armed forces and create a pool for mobilisation. Reserves serve as a link between society and military as well. It is necessary for citizens to understand the importance of armed forces for the defence of the country. The civilian control of armed forces is another important feature of civil-military relations. As Holborn writes, when there is no control over professional armed forces they might become a source of opposition against legally elected government. There are other possibilities to fill the ranks of armed forces. One might consider hiring short-term volunteers as suggested by O’Hanlon and Moskos. There are many possibilities who to recruit. Some suggestions are foreigners in exchange for citizenship or students who would be thus able to pay for their education. Such short-term soldiers could help in crisis management missions, especially peacekeeping ones.

Conscription is still an option as a recruitment technique. In this case, the attitude of the society is of crucial importance. If the culture does not support conscription, it would be backward to apply such an approach. An alternative possibility is to combine voluntary and compulsory enlistment. The professional core might be complemented by volunteers. Reserves might be composed of conscripts and volunteers, where conscription would be used only if voluntary recruitment fails to supplement army needs. The problem is that equity and the effects of such an approach are highly questionable. Probably the most suitable way to provide recruits for armed forces is to use the voluntary enlistment on more than one level. Ideal armed forces should thus consist of a professional standing force, reserves and there should be also an additional voluntary participation of citizens like creating militias or similar units that would bolster the armed forces in the time of need.

4. The most suitable military recruitment model for small states and middle powers in Europe

For the purposes of this study, the authors have excluded all petty states of Europe from the research. The main reason is that the majority of them does not even possess armed forces. Consequently, Vatican City, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, Iceland, and Malta are excluded.

In addition, the estimations of the most suitable military recruitment model is made only for the states with democratically elected governments. It is almost certain that a similar model would be the most appropriate also in countries with the lower level of democracy. However,

\(^{52}\) Crebs, Dandeker, Holborn, Janowitz, Moskos, O’Hanlon.
democratic states tend to act similarly and thus there is a place for more generalized observations when trying to find out the best solution for military recruitment.

First, the population growth rate of European countries needs to be considered. Both Poland and Spain have a negative growth rate (-0.03% and -0.13%). The only middle power with positive but rather reduced growth rate is Italy with 0.02%. Most of the Central and Eastern European countries also have a negative growth rate with Latvia reaching -0.77%. On the opposite side stands Belarus (0.32%) and Czech Republic (0.25%). Western European countries have a much higher growth rate, with the exception of Portugal -0.51%. Only four countries in the entire Europe exceeded the growth rate of 1%, namely Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland.

When exploring this issue further, we find out that the low population growth causes the ageing of the population in Europe as a whole with just a few states being an exception. We present the data about the population structure of the European Union from January 2015, knowing that situation in other European states is similar. From 2001 to 2015, the median age of the EU member states increased by 4.1 years. In 2001, it was 38.3, reaching 42.4 in 2015. Old-age dependency in EU is 28.8%. Total age dependency, however, is much higher – it is actually 52.6%, meaning that in 2015 there were approximately two people working per one dependent person. Projection of the future suggests that ageing of the population will increase and there is a high possibility that it can become even more pronounced. The age group of people older than 80 years should double in 2015-2080 from 5.3% to 12.3%. Due to ageing, the old-age dependency is projected to grow to 51% in 2080 and total dependency might reach 77.9%.

Taking into consideration the ageing of the population, Pernica suggested the possible competition for manpower between police and armed forces as they might struggle to recruit enough manpower in the future. Thus, creating or allowing paramilitary organizations or militias under the control of lower administrative units of a country seems to be an idea worth of exploring. The importance of such organization is two-fold. It provides some kind of military training and thus it prepares a part of the population for eventual crises. On the other hand, its importance is also educational. Militias may serve as an instrument in the national defence education. This would provide a broader link between national security and civil society. When allowing militias to come into existence, the states have to be very careful, creating legal boundaries for such organizations. Another thing to keep in mind is that these organizations have to be under control of lower administrative units which would guarantee that the organization is not allowed to promote any radical and unconstitutional ideas. We expect that such militias might even absorb illegal units providing military training in countries where basic military training for citizens during the peacetime is not yet established.

After decades of relative peace in Europe, the security environment took a new radical turn. On the level of internal affairs, the radicalization of politics is a fact. More and more votes of citizens are cast in favour of various radical parties. Europe is also weakened by the influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa and the ensuing difficulties tied to the process of

their social and political integration. The war in Ukraine finally showed how fragile the security in Europe really is. Moreover, the annexation of Crimea and the Russian assistance provided to the Ukrainian separatists propelled new tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation.

Under these circumstances, it is necessary to provide strong connection between the armed forces and the society (efficient and strong civil-military relations). At the same time, it is vital to accentuate the link between national defence and security in order to strengthen the sense of citizens’ co-responsibility for the security of the state. We already mentioned militias as part of such a base. However, the first step should be the inclusion of national defence education on primary and secondary schools. It might certainly bolster the willingness of young generations to voluntarily serve in armed forces or to undergo military training, become active reservists or join militias if such possibilities are enabled. Society must be informed about the threats arising from the current security environment and be prepared to react should the crisis occur. Ministries of defence of particular countries should devote a part of the budget to public relations. As a part of such effort, high moral value of national defence should be strongly encouraged and publicly endorsed by national leaders.

Armed forces in contemporary security environment have to consist of standing professional armed forces based on voluntary enlistment. This core of armed forces is best trained and able to use modern technologies, apply strategies and tactics, and in the case of need, it is the key element in protecting the territory of the country. Foreign missions, quite frequent nowadays, are also carried out mainly by professional soldiers. The professional core of the armed forces should always be based on voluntary enlistment to attract those who are willing to serve as professional forces. It is highly likely that those who chose to serve voluntarily in the military will do so not only for a financial compensation but because of their convictions as well.

However, it is very costly to maintain a large professional army if military operations are not carried out consistently over extended period of time. Taking into account this fact, the best solution would be to develop and bolster a reserve system. Usually, the largest part of the reserves is staffed by ex-professionals. They stay in reserve for certain period of time after they leave the active military service. Another part of the reserve component might consist of volunteers or draftees. From the economic point of view, the decision to be made between a voluntary and a compulsory service is clear. Conscription in general is less economically efficient and should only become a part of the military recruitment in time of war or crisis that requires a high defence potential. From the cultural point of view, however, it is important that the recruitment model is consistent with the country's culture. Therefore, we do not think it is necessary or even desirable to end conscription if the society accepts it. Economists never totally approved or disproved positive effects of a military service based on later earnings of draftees. Most likely, it highly depends on the form of military service. To make the system of conscription as efficient as possible it is worth considering the system proposed by Janowitz. Conscription would sustain the link between military and society. It should not be forgotten that conscripts also have to receive decent wages and adequate accommodation.

Another way to create a reserve is by voluntary enlistment. For training and possible deployment, reservists have to be paid fair wages. The country has to arrange that employers would allow its employees to go for a training period and provide them time off if necessary. There are many ways to attract citizens to serve in reserves. Citizens should have possibility to complete the military training as close to their homes as possible. In addition, the time necessary for training should be divided. Training should take place mainly during the weekends in order
not to disrupt primary employment. Attention should be paid to college students. They might be attracted by state aid and grants for education. Similar approach, as proposed by Moskos, might be of benefit. Last but not least, the military reserve should be in a higher state of readiness to act with great flexibility and foster regular forces in time of need and allow other reserve components to mobilize, should the crisis occur.

Summing up, the best model of military recruitment for European countries is one based on the broad link between armed forces and society. National defence education is of high importance. Shared values regarding national defence are a precondition for attracting civilians into the army. Paramilitary organizations foster the link between armed forces and society and would foster the ability of society to act in time of crisis. Regular armed forces should be composed of highly trained professionals. Reserves should be there to decrease military spending and provide a force that can back professionals in military operations.

5. Conclusion

The attempt to categorize states based on their power is not an easy task to be accomplished, and it is a hard task to be completely accurate. There is no precise indicator for the concept of power, which is rather the combination of different indicators that might allow us to create the most probable rank of different tiers of states. Due to the fact that the aim of this article is to determine what kind of recruitment model is the most suitable for small states and middle powers, we mainly focused on the military strength of particular middle states. Nevertheless, we attempted to make a precise evaluation of states' power potential and, therefore, we carefully considered current trends in each of the potential middle power states within Europe. This enabled us to exclude from the analysis the small states, and to focus on the relevant middle powers in the European space: Italy, Poland, and Spain.

After examining the theory of military recruitment, we were able to formulate a few key conclusions:

- Except for foreseeable emergencies like war or armed conflict, it is never viable to introduce compulsory military service. It costs more and there are additional costs connected with its suspension. Most importantly we may mention restricted turnover in armed forces; potential to professionalize the military service; and freedom to choose one's occupation, thus generating more income for the state budget.
- Each of the states included in our study enforces compulsory military service in a different way. In each country, there are different conditions under which the compulsory military service is carried out.
- Conscription is still an option for the recruitment. In this case, the attitude of the society is of fundamental importance. If the national culture does not favour conscription, it would be ill advised to apply such a technique. Another possibility is to combine voluntary and compulsory enlistments. The professional core of the armed forces might be complemented by volunteers. Reserves might be composed of conscripts and volunteers, while conscription would be used only if voluntary recruitment fails to close the gap of the army needs. The problem is that equity and the effects of such an approach are highly questionable. Probably the most suitable way to staff the armed forces is to combine a professional core, reserves, and militias controlled by lower state administrative units.

We also raised a question of the military recruitment models, asking what model fits better in the European democratic states. After a short examination of the current political, security and social trends in Europe, we came to the conclusion that it is a system based on the strong links
between armed forces and society. National defence education is also of high importance. Shared values on national security and defence are a precondition for attracting civilians into the army. And paramilitary organizations foster the link between armed forces and society and would foster the ability of the society to act in time of crisis. Regular armed forces should be composed of highly trained professionals. Reserves should be there to decrease military spending and provide a force that can back the professionals in military operations.

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