



Post-Paris agreement negotiations: A commitment to multilateralism despite the lack of funding

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ABSTRACT

This paper identifies which topics of negotiation are providing momentum for climate negotiations after the Paris Agreement and to what extent. To do so, it examines the main requests that developing countries have expressed through different negotiation groups between 2017 and 2023. To measure the progression of climate negotiations, the paper identifies whether those requests have been translated into COP decisions. This is done through discourse analysis contained in numerous daily reports of COPs, summaries, and official decisions. In this research, COP decisions are defined as the expression of collective negotiations in the UNFCCC system, and as decisions with political consequences. The paper identifies advancements on twenty-nine issues in areas like gender, loss and damage, facilitative dialogue, adaptation, and the acceleration of finance flows to small-island developing states. Eighteen issues have been identified as acknowledged in COP decisions, but not fully addressed. These correspond mainly to finance-related items and the commitment to contributing US\$100 billion to climate mitigation. Sixteen issues have been identified as ignored in the COP decisions examined. The conclusions suggest that there is agreement on creating new frameworks to allow further discussions on important topics brought to the table by developing states, but there is no real agreement on increasing funding in a significant way. Also, conclusions underline that despite the lack of sufficient funding, commitment to fighting climate change has not declined over time, and states continue to prefer multilateral negotiations to working outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change mandate.

1. Introduction

Global environmental politics and multilateral environmental agreements have received increasing attention in the last decades. Official climate negotiations have been ongoing since 1992, resulting in three legal instruments: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Agreement (2015). These legal precedents were established only after several decades of discussions. For some, the results of those negotiations over the years have been weak, partly because the agreements fostered between diplomats at the COPs do not necessarily reflect the different political positions of the governments that they represent, resulting in collective inaction (Ruffini, 2018). Others believe that the Paris Agreement can instigate changes more quickly than expected since, after three decades, climate science is settled, climate denialism has declined, and the fossil fuel industry is under growing pressure

(Cléménçon, 2016, 2023). Either way, the truth is that environmental issues are probably the most complicated and difficult challenges to resolve in this century given that they are comprised of a myriad of factors, including political negotiations, scientific knowledge, citizen activism, industry pressure, and other civil society movements (Suskind, 1994). Considering this complexity, the general objective of this paper is to identify which topics of negotiations within the framework of the UNFCCC are progressing after the adoption of the Paris Agreement and to what extent.

While participants in climate negotiations have revealed some of the main setbacks, advances, and dynamics of the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) from the inside (Bueno, 2020, 2018; Dimitrov, 2010, 2016), there is a strand of literature that has focused on the involvement of non-state actors in global environmental governance and on how they can be helpful in advancing new and more acceptable solutions for all stakeholders (Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; Hickmann and Elsässer,

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2020). Other studies have examined the creation of regimes (Krasner, 1983; Young, 1991; Downie, 2005), the role of international institutions and state behaviour (Levy et al., 1992), the reasons for the failure of regimes (Young, 2001; Breitmeyer et al., 2011), and their impacts (Hass et al., 1993; Bernauer, 1995; O'Neill, 2017).

The slow progress made after 30 years of climate negotiations has led some authors to question the effectiveness of multilateralism, proposing instead unilateralism as a way to move negotiations forward (Eckersley, 2012). Other authors suggest that the study of agreement formation has the potential to influence the global political order of relations. This influence consequently highlights a need to put greater emphasis on the utility of our work as researchers and the need to use different theoretical approaches, given that climate negotiations seem to advance at a slow pace compared to the rapid environmental degradation (Hughes et al., 2021). In accordance with this idea, some have proposed and resorted to observing interpersonal interactions at meetings with the goal of capturing less perceivable dynamics during diplomatic negotiations as a way to further advance the understanding of global environmental politics (Nasiritousi et al., 2014; Paterson, 2019; Hughes and Vadrot, 2019).

Indeed, nature's timeline does not conform to the timeline of politics, and while scientists warn of the lack of political commitment and urgency (IPCC, 2023), parties continue to discuss the same issues year after year. After the signing of the Paris Agreement, seven COPs have been convened: COP22 in Marrakech, COP23 in Fiji/Bonn, COP24 in Katowice, COP25 in Chile/Madrid, COP26 in Glasgow, COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, and COP28 in Dubai. Even so, the Paris Agreement is not fully operational yet. What topics are States discussing in the COPs eight years after Paris? Are climate change negotiations progressing at all? If so, what are those areas and how are they being approached in multilateral discussions?

This research aims to respond to the above questions, focusing on those topics and priorities that have been identified by developing countries in their discourses. It also aims to examine the progress made on the achievement on those topics. To do so, the paper will identify the main requests made by negotiation groups from developing countries during COPs after the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015. Then, it seeks to examine whether those requests have been translated into COP decisions as a way of measuring whether or not these climate negotiations are progressing. Despite not being legally binding, COP decisions are the expression of collective negotiations in the UNFCCC system and have political consequences. Additionally, COP decisions are the main instrument of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement for encapsulating those items that have been included in the ever-complicated political agenda. As indicated by Vihma (2015), the COPs and their decision-making processes have been and will likely continue to be a crucial element in global climate governance. Therefore, analyzing negotiations in COPs is an effective way to determine where climate governance stands after years fighting for a legal instrument that would put the international community on the path to facing climate change.

Hence, environmental governance, understood as attempts by governing bodies to alleviate recognized environmental dilemmas (Davidson and Frickel, 2004), provides an analytical framework for examining the complex and multi-scalar institutional arrangements, social practices, and actors engaged in environmental decision-making (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 491). By examining the discussions undertaken between COP 2017 and 2023, this research seeks to contribute to the understanding of climate decision-making and generate new knowledge (based on a systematic review) of the progress achieved in the latest climate COPs. The paper also aids in filling a gap identified by Carattini and Löschel (2021): the focus should be shifted from how much is yet to be done to how much has already been achieved.

2. Strengthening environmental regimes

Despite critiques on its vagueness (Levy et al., 1995), the most

accepted definition of an international regime is that of Krasner (1983), who defines it as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. Regime formation has at least three stages: agenda formation, institutional choice, and operationalization. While the first stage comprises the emergence of an issue on the agenda, institutional choice takes that issue to the point of agreement on the provisions of a specific regime. The operationalization stage often involves making decisions about the functioning of the regime, in order to handle financial matters and deal with various administrative issues (Levy et al., 1995). It is at this final stage where the Paris Agreement negotiations currently stand, given that despite its adoption in 2015 and its ratification in 2016, there were still many technical details to be completed to make the agreement fully operational.

Although COPs are the most salient annual meetings, talks and discussions on climate change happen year-round. For instance, other occasions in which negotiations take place include the Standing Committees, the Supervisory Bodies, the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), or the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). They all support the work of the Conference of the Parties, which serves as the culmination of the other points of negotiation.

High-Level Segments, opening ceremonies, and COP plenaries serve as platforms for political statements, and also serve as mechanisms for making decisions and checking advances by different working groups. These platforms additionally host an exchange of demands, compromises, and discussions around climate. Although we tend to divide parties between North and South, developed and developing, it is the negotiations' flexibility between those binaries that allows them to progress. But as Mitchell (2009) points out, even when states have a motivation for collective action and agree on goals of such actions, acute obstacles may arise. These obstacles to progression of negotiations range from different beliefs and cultural perspectives surrounding how to implement a solution to insufficient capacity to administer or enforce domestic policy (Chasek et al., 2014). For instance, Bueno (2018) reminds us that access to technology and finance, as well as the preference for mitigation or adaptation measures as approaches to address climate change have often been a source of disagreement in climate negotiations. Negotiations of regime formation appear to succeed "only when integrative bargaining or a search for mutually beneficial solutions assumes a prominent role in the process" (Young and Osherenko, 1993: 13). During negotiations, states consider the arguments and respond to suggestions made by other states, non-state actors, and individuals in an effort to find innovative, integrative solutions that advance both other parties' interests and their own (Mitchell, 2009).

Another issue to consider when examining environmental regimes is what is required for their effectiveness. Susskind and Ali (2015) pointed to three main obstacles of global cooperation: 1) the split between developed and developing countries; 2) the stubborn persistence of national sovereignty as an important goal in itself; and 3) an apparent lack of incentive to bring some nations to the bargaining table for serious discussions about the nature of global environmental threat and the challenges of sustainable development.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement, Keohane and Oppenheimer (2016) foresaw that parties would begin what Putnam (1988) called a "two-level game" involving a combination of international strategic interaction and domestic politics. They identified three types of actors: 1) committed governments of the Organisation for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that needed to persuade other states to make commitments while maintaining domestic support for costly climate change action; 2) governments of major emerging economies that are somewhat willing to face climate change given the impacts they are already feeling and that have internal support for this either because of environmental concerns or because of possible economic opportunities (in the energy transition, for example); and 3) governments in small, poor countries that would place the

responsibilities on major emitters and would attempt to access monetary compensation to maintain domestic support.

What seems true is that environmental regimes evolve over time due to changing contexts, changing interests of national governments, and the greater engagement of non-state actors in climate governance (Böhmelt, Koubi and Bernauer, 2014; Bäckstrand et al., 2017). The world in which the UNFCCC was agreed upon in 1992 is radically different than that of 2015, as a review of the last 30 years of international climate negotiations would show (Cléménçon, 2023).

3. Methodology

The paper uses discourse analysis as a method to situate actors and actions during COPs after Paris and to identify how decisions and ideas are proposed by different actors involved in environmental governance. In line with similar studies (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016; Dimitrov, 2010, 2016), this paper approaches COPs as empirical sites of active political activity that allow us to examine how climate change is understood and governed by different actors. The author of the paper has not participated in COP negotiations and the analysis presented is done as an outside observation.

The content of climate discussions has been gathered from three main sources. The most relevant of them are the records published by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), a service provided by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) on everyday official UNFCCC negotiations during COPs. ENB publications have been deemed as “indispensable” to the understanding of climate negotiations (O’Neill and Haas, 2019) and have served previous academic works (Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016). Each ENB is around three to four pages, offering information on the proceedings and summarizing daily discussions as well as the decisions adopted. A total of 68 ENB documents—corresponding to daily reports of COPs23–28—have been analyzed.

Summaries of COPs made by Carbon Brief have also been examined to complement the more neutral style of the summaries by ENB. Carbon Brief offers complete analysis and reports on the development of COPs. Finally, COP decisions between 2017 and 2022 and draft decisions for COP in 2023 have been examined to identify the evolution of demands. This is, in fact, the main reason why position documents or draft negotiating texts have not been considered in the research; both of these types of documents reflect a still photo, but not the dynamic exchange of ideas between parties. The difference is important and was highlighted by the UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell, who during the COP of Egypt asked leaders to ensure consistency between the visions expressed in their high-level statements and their delegations’ positions during negotiations.

Due to space limitation, the paper only includes a systematic analysis of the discourse of some negotiation groups of developing states. The groups examined are G77 + China, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the African group, Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC). Considering that the G77 + China group alone is composed of 134 members, the groups examined cover the demands of most of the world’s developing states. Others, such as Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our America (ALBA by its acronym in Spanish) or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have been discarded for simplification purposes. Demands from developed countries (e.g. European Union, Environmental Integrity Group) have deliberately been set aside for three main reasons. Firstly, the role of developed countries in international relations has been analyzed countless times, leaving the positions of developing countries in the background. Secondly, the fact that developing countries are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, heightens the need for more research on their priorities in climate change policy. Finally, developing countries represent the majority of states in the current international system. This is evidenced by the fact that while there are 193 United Nations member

states, only 42 of them are part of annex I of the UNFCCC, which lists those countries that are generally recognized as “developed” in the Paris Agreement (Pauw, Mbeva and van Asselt, 2019).

Annex I of this research synthesizes the demands made by developing countries in the opening ceremonies and COP plenaries between COP23 in Fiji (2017) and COP28 in Dubai (2023). Information included in this annex has been gathered from the ENB reports which may not contain all the demands from these groups of states. However, they do provide a good base for analysis and for identifying trends that can help us understand countries’ priorities and their progress. The fact that demands of each of these groups have been followed along six different COPs can also compensate for missing information in each specific COP.

To identify whether issues brought up in these COPs are progressing at all during negotiations, the following steps have been taken: first, each of the groups’ demands (60 in total) have been numbered (as seen in Annex I). Then, a second table has been created to reflect how those demands have been incorporated (or not) into COP decisions (Annex II). To elaborate Annex II, I have searched for keywords from the demands in Annex I in COP decisions. This has been done using the PDF search function. For instance, item 11 in COP23 is “Adopt gender action plan”. In that year’s COP decision, I searched for “gender action plan”, which led me to identify Decision 3/CP23 (Establishment of a gender action plan). This system has been used for all items in Annex I. Annex II then summarizes, with precise information, whether issues identified by states have been addressed and how.

A simplified yet visual way of categorizing the level of fulfillment of each item is proposed as follows. Three asterisks (***) classify those issues that have been addressed with either clear references to them, mechanisms, or solutions to those issues. Two asterisks (**) identify those issues that are mentioned (but not addressed) in COP decisions, such as when indicated that they will be addressed or discussed in the future. The use of one asterisk (*) corresponds with those issues that are not mentioned in COP decisions. The asterisks for each item are included in Annex I and Table 1. One limitation of this methodology is that there may be demands brought up in one COP that may have been addressed in the decision of following COPs, but appear in Annex I as not addressed (*) if there are not any mentions of them that year. However, I have tried to do a follow up of all issues not addressed to check whether they have been tackled in following COPs.

The paper continues with the data collection on the demands of developing negotiation groups examined. Section five covers how each demand has been addressed in COP decisions, dividing them into three different categories: ignored, acknowledged, and actioned. The discussion section highlights, among other issues, how technical details absorb negotiations and examines the main obstacles to greater progress. The conclusions suggest that, despite the lack of funding, commitment to combating climate change has not declined over time, and states continue to prefer multilateral negotiations to working outside the UNFCCC mandate.

4. What developing countries demand in COPs

The urge for developing countries to scale up financial support and the call for clarity in the progress towards achieving the US\$100 billion are constants in all COPs, and so is the demand from developed countries for the recognition of their financial efforts.

As seen in Graph 1, although finance and the achievement of US\$100 billion have been separated to allow for a better analysis, they are both related to access to funds, the most crucial issue for developing countries and for success in addressing climate change. The commitment of contributing US\$100 billion by 2020, which was included in the COP21 decision but omitted from the Paris Agreement, is a source of constant recrimination by developing countries, who see this as key to strengthening trust in the process.

For instance, as stated in Annex I, at the group level, the LMDC as well as the G77 + China group’s speeches are very much focused on

Table 1
Requests by developing countries and their level of achievement.

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COP23 FIJI (2017)		
<p>1) Design facilitative dialogue: Decision 1/CP.23 (II.10) welcomes with appreciation the design of the 2018 facilitative dialogue, to be known as the Talanoa Dialogue.</p> <p>2) Work on L&D: Decision 5/CP.23. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (...) encourages parties to actively engage in the work and to disseminate, promote and make use of the products of the WIM (...).</p> <p>7) Establish a 5-year program on L&D: Decision 5/CP.23 notes that the Executive Committee will evaluate progress made towards implementing its five-year rolling work plan in 2020 and at regular intervals at subsequent meetings of the Executive Committee.</p> <p>8) Accelerate finance flows to SIDS: Decision 9/CP.23 notes with appreciation the significant scaling-up of the operations of the Green Climate Fund in 2017, including (...) USD 41.8 million (...) two thirds of which are in the least developed countries, small island developing States (...).</p> <p>9) Expert groups under WIM Excom: Decision 5/CP.23 requests the secretariat, under the guidance of the Executive Committee (...) to organize (...) an expert dialogue to explore a wide range of information, inputs and views on ways for facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise (...).</p> <p>11) Adopt gender action plan: Decision 3/CP.23 establishes a gender action plan.</p> <p>13) Support work on emerging issues such as indigenous peoples: Decision 2/CP.23 creates a local communities and indigenous peoples platform.</p>	<p>3) Financial support for the WIM: Decision 5/CP.23. WIM for L&D. Request to the Secretariat to open dialogue that includes finance.</p> <p>4) Clarify eligibility criteria from the GEF and GCF: Decision 9/CP.23 (7): Requests the Board to ensure that all developing country Parties have access to all the financial instruments available through the Green Climate Fund, in line with the eligibility criteria referred to in the governing instrument and relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.</p> <p>5) Progress in finance-related items: Decision 6/CP.23 on Long-term finance welcomes with appreciation the continued progress of developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion annually by 2020.</p> <p>14) Commitments on finance, technology transfer, capacity building, loss and damage: Decision 5/CP.23 requests the secretariat (...) to organize (...) an expert dialogue to explore a wide range of information, inputs and views on ways for facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise (...), including finance, technology and capacity-building, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (...).</p>	<p>6) Advance on adaptation communication guidance</p> <p>10) Identify new collective goal on finance</p> <p>12) Support work on emerging issues such as oceans, health</p> <p>15) Agreement to CBDR and flexibility</p>
COP24 KATOWICE (2018)		
<p>1) Called for upholding the CBDR-RC in the outcome: Decision 3/CMA.1 (...) the Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.</p> <p>2) COP decision on Talanoa Dialogue outcome: Decision 1/CP.24. V. Talanoa dialogue (...) Expresses its appreciation to the Presidents (...) for their leadership in the organization, conduct and conclusion of the Talanoa Dialogue.</p> <p>3) Full operationalization of Paris Agreement Article 9.5. Decision 12/CMA.1. Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.</p> <p>4) Consideration of countries' special circumstances: Decision 4/CMA.1 recalls that the LDC and SIDS may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission development reflecting their special circumstances in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement.</p>	<p>5) Constructive engagement by developed countries on finance and tech transfer: Decision 4/CMA.1 recalls that the LDC and SIDS may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission development reflecting their special circumstances.</p>	
COP25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)		
<p>7) Stress importance of adaptation finance: Decision 1/CP.25 recalls that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation.</p> <p>8) Importance of grant-based resources to avoid increasing the developing countries' debt burden: Decision 1/CMA.2 recalls that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies (...) especially those that are particularly vulnerable (...) considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.</p> <p>12) Cooperative approaches: Decision 9/CMA.2. Footnote 2 mentions draft decision text on guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in art. 6.</p>	<p>3) Predictable funds for adaptation: Decision 1/CMA2 urges developed country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation.</p> <p>5) Long term finance: Decision 2/CMA.2 (...) Also recognizes the urgency of enhancing the mobilization of action and support, including finance (...) for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable (...).</p> <p>10) For developed countries to increase funding channeled through the GCF and GEF: FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.1 Annex (...) Each Annex II Party shall provide information on the financial support that it has disbursed and committed for the (...) the following: The Global Environment Facility (...) and the Green Climate Fund.</p> <p>11) Transparency for developed countries regarding implementation: Decision 1/CP.25 recalls the commitment made by developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (...).</p>	<p>1) Art. 6 should reflect diversity of NDCs</p> <p>2) Avoid double counting</p> <p>4) SCF to present a report on achievement of US\$100 billion</p> <p>6) Art. 6 needs to reform climate finance landscape, including L&D</p> <p>9) Ensure environmental integrity</p> <p>13) Depoliticizing the flow of financial resources</p>

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COP26 GLASGOW (2021)		
<p>3) Need of transparency of support: Annex / IV Reporting mentions a biennial transparency report.</p> <p>8) Called for reaching agreement on the operationalization of global goal on adaptation: Decision 1/CMA.3 recognizes the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and welcomes the launch of the comprehensive two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation.</p> <p>10) Transparency package: FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1. Annex. Reporting. Several mentions on the need for transparency reports.</p> <p>11) Operationalization of Santiago Network on L&D: Decision 1/CMA.3 welcomes the further operationalization of the Santiago network</p>	<p>1) Called on developed countries to reduce emissions and scale up provision of support: Decision 1/CMA.3 emphasizes the urgent need for Parties to increase their efforts to collectively reduce emissions (...).</p> <p>2) Need for commitments to US\$ 100 billion: Decision 1/CMA.3 urges developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently.</p> <p>5) Major economies to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2023: Decision 1/CMA.3 calls upon Parties to (...) rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.</p> <p>6) Financial support for L&D (that should be additional to US\$ 100 billion): Decision 1/CMA.3 reiterates the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance (...) for (...) loss and damage.</p>	<p>4) Called for a formal platform to take stock of gap to the 1.5°C</p> <p>7) Consideration of Africa's special needs and circumstances</p> <p>9) New finance goal at COP27</p>
COP27 SHARM EL-SHEIKH (2022)		
<p>1) Institutional structure and modalities for L&D assistance: Decision 12/CMA.4 establishes the Santiago network for L&D. Decision includes an institutional structure (secretariat, advisory network), and funds to support technical assistance.</p> <p>3) Global goal on adaptation: Decision 3/CMA.4. Glasgow-Sharm el -Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3.</p> <p>4) References to phase out fossil fuels: Decision 1/CP.27 calls upon Parties to accelerate the development (...) including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.</p> <p>5) New, additional, predictable, grant-based finance: Decision 1/CMA.4 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan mentions the need of (...) scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation for vulnerable regions.</p> <p>6) Progress on US\$ 100 billion: Decision 1/CP.27 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan Footnote 11 informs on the Standing Committee on Finance. 2022. Report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year (...).</p> <p>7) Results on L&D: Decision 2/CP.27. Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage.</p> <p>10) Doubling of adaptation finance: Decision 18.CMA.4. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund include numerous new pledges for the fund.</p> <p>11) Operationalization of Santiago Network: Decision 1/CMA.4 further welcomes the adoption of decisions 11/CP.27 and 12/CMA.4, establishing the institutional arrangements of the Santiago network (...) to enable its full operationalization.</p>	<p>2) Delivering on US\$ 100 billion to rebuild trust: Decision 1/CP.27 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan expresses serious concern that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (...) has not yet been met and urges developed country Parties to meet the goal.</p> <p>8) Deepening climate injustice: Decision 1/CP.27 Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems (...) and also noting the importance of 'climate justice', when taking action to address climate change.</p> <p>9) Definition of climate finance: Decision 5/CMA.4 Adoption of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance. It contains several items including discussions on possible options of finance, technical expert dialogue, etc.</p>	
COP26 DUBAI (2023)		
<p>1) Capitalization of the L&D Fund: Decision 5/CMA.5. Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage.</p> <p>2) Called for agreement on a robust framework for the global goal on adaptation, keeping SIDS in mind: Decision 2/CMA.5 Global goal on adaptation reaffirms that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account (...) needs of developing country Parties, especially (...) small island developing State.</p> <p>4) For developed countries to provide finance for losses and damages experienced in developing countries: Draft decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5. Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage.</p> <p>29*** issues</p>	<p>3) Adaptation finance for the Paris -Agreement: Decision /CMA.5 Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation.</p> <p>5) Evidence that the US\$ 100 billion pledge has been achieved: FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17. Draft decision, notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation was not met (...) welcomes the ongoing efforts of developed country Parties towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year.</p> <p>18** issues</p>	<p>16* issues</p>

Key: Three asterisks (***) : issues that have been addressed with either clear references to them, mechanisms, or solutions to those issues. Two asterisks (**): issues that are mentioned (but not addressed) in COP decisions. One asterisk (*): issues that are not mentioned in COP decisions. Each topic's number corresponds to the numbers used in annexes I and II for easier comparison. The table includes excerpts of how the topics have been addressed in COP decisions. More details and additional excerpts can be found in annex I and annex II. Source: Author's own elaboration.

finance, which they see as key to effectively addressing not only climate change but also climate justice. Both groups demand advances on loss and damage (L&D), technology transfer, capacity building, and the delivery of the US\$100 billion; clarification of the eligibility criteria for accessing the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Green Climate

Fund (GCF); and the sine qua non acknowledgement of the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities principle.

There is a noticeable evolution in the demands by AOSIS. These vary from insistence on work on loss and damage in COP Fiji (either in the form of progress in the creation of the framework, in the establishment

of a 5-year programme for L&D, or in the creation of an expert group under the Warsaw International Mechanism for L&D - WIM), to finance for adaptation in Chile-Madrid and Dubai, to the need to focus on the reduction of emissions and on phasing out fossil fuels in more recent COPs.

For the African group, the clear focus is on access to finance in all its forms: the creation of a new collective goal, the full operationalization of article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, or the importance of accessing grant-based resources. Also, in this group there have been several demands regarding the recognition of the special needs of the African continent in view of the impacts of climate change, which have the potential to materialize as requests for more funding to face that impact. In particular, this specific claim has raised some concerns among other developing countries, like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU): during COP26, these countries cautioned against the creation of new categories, underscoring that all developing countries need assistance for sustainable recoveries. With this, they opened a small breach among developing countries and warned of a spillover effect on the issues of financing and transparency (Bueno Rubial, 2020).

The definition of climate finance is another source of disagreement for groups like LMDC. This is important given that some high-interest loans are often included as climate finance (Carbon Brief, 2021), and as pointed out by Senegal's negotiator, less developed countries are looking for grants, and grants do not come from private finance (Carbon Brief, 2022). This is why the insistence of developed countries to consider public and private funds as contributions to climate change is contested, and the reason why, as seen in Annex I, explicit requests for grants tend to come from African countries, specifically those in most need of accessing those resources.

The AILAC group is the most varied in their demands, which range from adopting a gender plan to supporting work on emerging issues such as oceans, health, and indigenous peoples. In COP 26–28 the increase in funding and the operationalization of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage was also present in these groups' requests.

Other issues raised by negotiation groups include the facilitation of dialogue (G77 and ALLAC in COP23; AOSIS in COP24), ensuring integrity and transparency in the disbursement of funds (LMDC in COP25; and G77+China and African group in COP26), and exhibiting greater ambition in the reduction of emissions for developed countries (G77+China in COP26).


5. Actioned, mentioned, ignored

This section examines how the requests above have been incorporated into COP decisions. As seen in Table 1 below, the number of issues addressed in COPs (29) is greater than those that have only been mentioned/acknowledged (18) or than those that have been ignored in COP decisions (16). However, this alone means little, and it is important to delve into what kind of issues exist in each of these three categories.

5.1. Actioned

Below are those questions raised by developing countries, in which some progress in COP decisions has been identified.

For instance, as requested by the African group in COP27, a report on the progress made by developed countries on the US\$100 billion was submitted by the Standing Committee on Finance in 2022. The report, however, clearly noted that the finance goal was not met, and it expressed concerns with the different methods and sources to quantify finance, as also pointed out in other countries' requests. To meet the finance goal, an additional 21–22% by 2023 would have needed to be reached (UNFCCC, 2022). Outside the Convention, developed countries have announced multiple contributions that have strengthened financial support for developing countries. These unilateral initiatives, however, have been highly criticized since access and conditions cannot be negotiated by developing countries and therefore are not included in



Graph 1. Number of demands by topics (COPs 23–28). Source: Author's own elaboration.

COP decisions.

The request from African countries to highlight the importance of grant-based resources (both in COP25 and COP27) has been addressed by underlining the need of particularly vulnerable countries of grant-based resources and the need to scale them up (Decision 1/CMA.2, Decision 1/CMA.4, Decision 13/CP27). The request to accelerate finance flows to SIDS (made by AOSIS in 2017), was included in Decision 9/CP.23, allocating a significant amount of funds for the least developed countries and small island developing States (see Annex II). Decision 10/CP.23 invites the GEF to improve access modalities for these countries. Additionally, the adoption of a new finance goal as requested by the African group was discussed in COP27, where it was decided that a new goal would be established after 2025, replacing the US\$100 billion target.

The call for facilitative dialogue on greater ambition was raised in COPs 23 and 24 by G77+China, AOSIS, and AILAC. The Talanoa Dialogue was adopted to keep trust in the process and to increase ambition. It was conducted during these two COPs, and it allowed participants (including ministers) to share stories that could serve as models to raise ambition and inform the preparation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Presidencies of COP22 and COP23, 2017).²

The request for more transparency on support given by developed countries and on mitigation efforts was reflected in decision 1/CMA.3, where multiple references to the need for more transparency appear. One example is the adoption of decisions on methodology to enhance transparency for action and support referred to in article 13 of the Paris Agreement. Another example is the need to submit a biennial transparency report to quantify mitigation in NDCs (included in the annex of the decision).

In addition to progress on the issues above, there are three big groups

² By September 2018, the Talanoa Dialogue had facilitated the telling of 474 stories by Parties and non-party stakeholders, over 280 written inputs, and over 75 events (Talanoa Dialogue, 2018).

of items that have experienced major achievement: loss & damage, adaptation, and gender.

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) was established at COP19 in 2013, one of its goals being to enhance finance to face the unavoidable impacts of climate change that cannot be adapted to. As reflected in [Graph 1](#) and Annex I, this is one of the issues most demanded by developing countries. Major progress was achieved in COP27 where, as requested by G77+China, AILAC, and LMDC, institutional structures and funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage were established, and not without intense discussions. While developed countries reluctantly suggested that major polluters (like China) should also contribute to the fund and that the fund, if created, would serve the “most vulnerable countries”, developing countries thought that this was a way of passing responsibility to developing countries ([Carbon Brief, 2022](#)). At the end of the conference, parties agreed that the fund could be accessed by any country that is “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” and could encompass a “mosaic” of solutions as requested by the EU, to include funds from private and public sources, and from inside and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

On the topic of gender, Decision 3/CP.23 adopted an action plan that includes some priority areas like capacity building, gender balance, knowledge-sharing, women’s leadership, and the monitoring of how gender-related mandates are implemented within the framework of the UNFCCC. Some of these priorities would be translated into updated information on gender balance in bodies, training on gender, capacity-building, or the exchange of knowledge among secretariat staff on work related to gender.

Progress on the goal of adaptation has been requested by almost all groups examined since 2017 (Annex I), and advances on this item have happened relatively quickly. Financial arrangements for adaptation were agreed upon in COP25, and a program for the global goal on adaptation was established in COP27. The goal refers to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change. This includes consideration of dimensions like impact, vulnerability, risk assessment, and capacity-building in areas like water, agriculture, cities, livelihoods, and biodiversity.

5.2. Acknowledged

Issues that have not advanced but have been acknowledged are basically synthesized into a single category: finance in all its forms. This includes clarification of the eligibility criteria to access funds from the GEF and the GCF, predictable funds for adaptation, long-term finance, commitment to the US\$100 billion, and the definition of climate finance. In all of these cases, the fact that these have been included in the decision as pending issues is a good start, but it is alarming that though it is by far the most demanded issue of all, no considerable progress has been made after all these years.

Developing countries’ frustration with the lack of finance is constant and is manifested in statements such as when Barbados said at COP26 that mitigation, finance, and adaptation gaps are “immoral and unjust”. Frustration is also exhibited when countries like Iran (in COP23), Senegal (in COP25), Bhutan (in COP26), and South Africa (in COP27) point to a lack of trust in the process given that developed countries are not honoring their financial commitments. Meanwhile, developed countries tend to repeat that they are on track to scale-up finance.

Another issue mentioned but not actioned in COP decisions is the call on developed countries to reduce emissions (demanded by G77+China in COP26). This was included in Decision 1/CMA.3 (COP26) as a collective request for all parties, but without specifying the request for “developed” countries. Instead, there is an invitation for all “parties to consider further actions to reduce” emissions.

The consideration to phase out fossil fuel subsidies requested by AOSIS in Glasgow was a ground-breaking decision ([Van Asselt and](#)

[Green, 2022; Depledge et al., 2022](#)) because it was the first time that a COP decision referred to constraining any fossil fuel. Incorporated into Decision1/CMA.3 as a general call for parties to accelerate the phase-down of unabated coal power and the phaseout of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, it did not make reference to developed countries, as originally requested (see Annex I). The same reference was included in the following year’s COP decision. Although not included in Annex II since Annex I does not include any reference to fossil fuels made by the parties examined, there has been progress on this item. In the draft of the COP decision in Dubai, there is a call for “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems (...) to achieve net zero by 2050”, and for the “phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions”.

5.3. Ignored

Finally, this section includes items that have been assessed as ignored in COP decisions ([Table 1](#)) despite having been requested by states (annex I). Issues include work on emerging issues such as oceans and health (requested by AILAC in 2017), the creation of a formal platform to take stock of the gap to the 1.5°C goal (requested by AOSIS in COP26), the depoliticization in the flow of financial resources (LMDC in COP25), and the consideration of Africa’s special needs and circumstances (African Group in COP26).

But even if issues included in this section have been categorized as ignored, some progress has been made on many of them. For instance, the consideration of countries’ special circumstances (in general) was included in other COP decisions, like Decision 4/CMA.1 (COP24) and Decision 1/CMA.2 (COP25), where the special circumstances of LDC, SIDS, and particularly vulnerable countries were acknowledged both in the preparation of action plans and in the access to financial resources. However, no references to Africa’s circumstances have been found in the documents examined.

Although the identification of a new collective goal on finance appears with one asterisk in COP23, the goal was reached in the Sharm el-Sheikh COP (2022) (Decision 5/CMA.4; see Annex II). The same happens with the mention of the CBDR principle, which was one of the demands from LMDC in 2017, and although it was not included in that year’s decision, it can be found as accomplished in Decision 3/CMA.1 a year later (see Annex II): (...) *the Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances.*

6. Discussion: what progress?

Vadrot and Hughes (2019) described some environmental negotiations as repetitive, scripted, and staged, both to observers and participants. The same can be said of the COPs examined, which shows that climate discussions are tedious, dense, and twirl around very few topics. Those few topics, though, evidence a clear division of North and South, where developing countries continue to ask for funding in every single meeting and are never satisfied with the money contributed, and developed countries will not give as much as they promised but ask for recognition of the little that they have given. Developing countries express a great degree of frustration and helplessness. Developed countries keep announcing new initiatives and finance pledges that developing countries do not know how to access.

[Levy, Haas, and Keohane \(1992\)](#) highlighted the lack of political, legal, and administrative capacity as a major setback in the effectiveness of global environmental governance. In this regard, some technical obstacles are difficult to understand and probably easy to solve with willingness. For instance, developing countries have expressed their frustration with the access to funding and the long waiting time for the resolution of projects many times. The AOSIS said in Glasgow that a proposal had been waiting four years for a funding decision. And Malaysia lamented that a considerable share of the financial assistance

they receive has gone to producing reports or building capacity for reporting. Surely parties could do more to simplify access to funds, since it is key for reaching global goals.

Also, negotiations get stuck in technical issues that are time-consuming for negotiators, frustrating both developed and developing countries. For instance, in Marrakech parties differed on whether to use “financial support” or “financial resources”, between “commitments” and “pledges”, or preferring to “take note of” rather than to “welcome” pledges. In the GEF Committee (in Marrakech too), there was also disagreement on references to “non-annex I parties”, “developing country parties”, or “parties eligible for funding”. The competence of each committee to discuss some issues is also a source of disagreement, such as when some think climate finance should be discussed in the Long-Term Finance Committee and others defend that the Standing Committee on Finance is a better place. In this context, it is almost miraculous that any progress is made.

6.1. Parties prefer multilateralism

Some of the main obstacles of global cooperation that [Suskind and Ali \(2015\)](#) described —North-South split, national sovereignty, lack of incentives— are only partially seen in the COPs examined. What can be observed in the post-Paris years is an effort from developed and developing countries to find acceptable mechanisms for all sides to operationalize the Paris Agreement and commit to the Convention. The breach between North and South, despite deep differences, is not bigger than it was decades ago. In fact, in many areas it has shrunk. Positions on the recognition of indigenous communities’ role, gender, deforestation, the recognition of science as a basis for negotiation, advances in adaptation, and loss and damage are all relatively new areas that have been incorporated into discussions in the last fifteen years in which parties tend to find common ground, despite difficulties. Moreover, open declarations pointing to the responsibility of fossil fuel companies and the need to phase them out in the last COP decisions are already shifting the narrative that dominated in the 1990 s and the early 2000 s —where everyone was responsible for climate change given that consumers drive the energy supply we all depend on— to fit a new reality where a few large companies are to blame for the climate crisis ([Cléménçon, 2023](#)). It is likely that this does not only pertain to the recent revelations of some oil companies’ deliberate denial of climate change despite having accurate information of their contribution to it ([Supran et al., 2023](#)), but also to the reality that national States do not have enough financial resources to face this crisis alone.

National sovereignty was also identified by [Suskind and Ali \(2015\)](#) as a major obstacle for cooperation. During the COPs examined, no major direct references have been made to this issue; however, there have been allusions to the need to adapt funding to national circumstances, especially in the cases of Africa and LMDC, who ask for depoliticizing access to finance resources. Indeed, some issues where progress has not been made (see [Table 1](#) and annex I) are somehow related to some countries’ very specific situations. Also, both developed and developing countries have expressed disappointment with some parties’ insistence on what they perceive as working outside existing mandates. Although some see negotiations between a smaller number of countries as a more effective way to address climate change ([Eckersley, 2012](#)), what this research observes is a commitment to and a preference for multilateral solutions. Moreover, the multiple initiatives presented by parties, and the fact that the short exit of the US from the Paris Agreement did not lead to a spillover effect, also means that countries are committed to the search for mutually beneficial solutions, which could be an indication of its success as proposed by [Young and Osherenko \(1993\): 13](#).

Clearly, quick and positive progress has been made on issues like loss and damage, adaptation, and gender. The three of them are especially important for addressing developing countries’ demands. It is also fair to point out that progress identified is very much linked to creating new institutional frameworks. And, finance, the greatest demand made by developing countries, is still missing, including for Loss and Damage, which still lacks a clear capitalization behind the fund.

Finally, the data gathered does not point to a lack of incentive for discussions on the nature of environmental threats ([Suskind and Ali, 2015](#)): science around climate change is not challenged by any of the parties (except briefly by the Trump administration). And this, in times of misinformation, virus conspiracies, and chatGPT, should be considered a major success despite the reality that the limit of global warming to 1.5°C is not feasible with current NDCs and with the reluctance seen in the last COPs to clearly embrace it as a key goal. Also, all parties seem to have incentives to negotiate: developing countries see it as a way of accessing funds; and developed countries want to address a problem they created decades ago, which is now taking the world down unknown paths with huge economic losses. Moreover, for some countries like China, climate change is now an economic opportunity, considering that they dominate critical mineral supply chains needed for the energy transition ([Castillo and Purdy, 2022](#)). This reflects what [Keohane and Oppenheimer \(2016\)](#) foresaw: a two-level game where the OECD is trying to commit others to the combat of climate change; governments of major emerging economies are seeking economic opportunities while committing to facing climate change; and governments in poor countries are trying to access funds.

6.2. Funding and trust as key issues

Although great concerns such as finance and the achievement of the US\$100 billion by developed countries is a constant in all groups, there are some differences in their demands, explained by the characteristics of the members of these groups, especially in groups other than the G77 —a mishmash of countries that vary from China to Sierra Leone to Sri Lanka. In the case of AOSIS, the focus is on loss and damage, which is essential to trying to guarantee their own existence; the African group requests finance in the form of grants; AILAC asks not only for increased funding, but also for support for the inclusion of gender and indigenous population in discussions; while LMDC is in need of capacity building and technology transfer.

Though the US\$100 billion contribution has not arrived on time, a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) was adopted in COP27 (and only time will tell whether this new goal will be reached or will only increase frustration among developing countries). In contrast to the previous goal, the NCQG is based on the needs and priorities of developing countries and not on the commitments of developed countries ([Alayza, 2023](#)). Additionally, but outside the Convention, developed countries have announced multiple contributions that would strengthen financial support for developing countries. These announcements, however, do not necessarily take into consideration the needs of developed countries.

In 2011, Young summarized some general findings of effective regimes, like the establishment and maintenance of maximum winning coalitions as opposed to minimum winning coalitions, or the maintenance of feelings of fairness and legitimacy ([Young, 2011](#)). In this sense, the disbursement of all the funds committed by developed parties is crucial to building trust in the process. As mentioned by [Suskind and Ali \(2015\)](#), there still exists a disagreement on whether funds for the implementation of environmental agreements will be added to the development assistance, as well as on the conditionality to access those funds that are already provided to the South. However, multiple declarations of acceptance of responsibility by Northern countries also exist,

and the historical demand for adaptation intensively promoted by G77+China (Bueno, 2018) is largely included in the Paris Agreement and posterior COPs.

Another success within the topic of trust is the deal reached in Glasgow on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which is related to international cooperation regarding carbon markets. The countries agreed upon transparent rules for reporting and, given that there are no penalties in the Paris Agreement for not meeting the NDCs—for developed countries especially—, this was vital for keeping track of whether countries are on the right track to maintaining global temperature below 2°C. The text included some degree of flexibility as requested by developing countries. Throughout the last COPs, many countries have announced net-zero pledges, mostly based on reforestation and forest protection projection. Reaching those successes has taken years of negotiations and discussions, but they should be regarded as an accomplishment of multilateral climate negotiations given the difficulties in reaching an agreement.

There are also huge advances in collectively highlighting the need to reduce the use of fossil fuels. This is a success given that many parties' economies are intimately linked to fossil fuels, that all petrostates will be impacted by this decision, and even that some of them (especially those more vulnerable like Bolivia, Cameroon, and Egypt) are already increasing their national indebtedness, further trapping them in fossil fuel dependency (Prince et al., 2023).

Other successes include meeting demands to discuss new topics and evolving climate discussions. These discussions range from gender, where substantial progress has been achieved, to the request to consider the impact of climate on food security, agriculture, the oceans, deforestation, and health. This evolution in discussions demonstrates a better understanding of the challenge ahead, and therefore opens a window for finding comprehensive solutions to climate change.

But in reality, what is generally found on the “advances” side of the discussion is little more than “announcements and agreements”. Examples of these include the announcement of a report (which says that committed funding has not been reached), agreements on the importance of grant-based resources (but with no funding attached), and agreements on the need to consider gender in negotiations (also lacking the attachment of funds). Indeed, regarding gender, some researchers have already highlighted two main barriers for progress on this topic: the lack of specific funding to support gender beyond ensuring that women are included within the UNFCCC framework, and the lack of political engagement by most parties on gender (Maguire et al., 2023). In summary, there is agreement on creating new frameworks to allow further discussions on important topics brought to the table by developing states, but there is no real agreement on increasing funding in a significant way.

The same can be said of the Loss and Damage Fund. Developing parties have long discussed and demanded the operationalization of the WIM and the Santiago Network. This fund is vital to achieving any shred of climate justice. But if developed countries are not able to increase the funds for this mechanism in the future, it is difficult to visualize how fairness, trust, and justice can materialize within the UNFCCC process.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to identify which topics of negotiations within the framework of the UNFCCC are progressing after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. As pointed out by Dimitrov et al. (2019), although there seems to be a consensus on the potential of the Paris Agreement to deliver its goals, there is no guarantee that it will succeed in reaching collective temperature goals, given a mix of legal complexities and uncertainties about global and domestic socioeconomic developments. Changes are probably occurring faster than

expected, but the significance of those changes should be questioned.

However, one can observe the parties' preference for multilateralism by examining the data gathered. This may not be the most effective way of addressing climate change (Eckersley, 2012), but after 30 years of climate discussions, it is what parties continue to demand. Countries' attempts to work outside official frameworks have been highly criticized and have lengthened discussions. Unilateral mechanisms can be seen as alternatives to overcoming the consensus' dictatorship within the convention to move climate action forward, and though they may be welcomed, multilateralism continues to be a preference for addressing such a complex challenge.

Although they all have a reason to be at the negotiating table, there is a major obstacle to faster progress: funding. And even so, this may be the reason why—as Cléménçon (2023) suggested— climate negotiations remain an important forum: they help to keep the pressure on rich countries to increase finance for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Funding will be key to ensuring trust in this imperfect process. Two concepts are crucial for making sure that an adequate amount of funding is properly used and benefiting all parties: transparency on how many funds and who receives that funding, and accountability for how those funds are spent.

There are multiple lines of research open for a better understanding of the effectiveness of environmental regimes, including the role and influence of non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and UN bodies in these processes, as well as how trust, transparency, and accountability can be strengthened among parties. Both optimism and criticism are needed to ensure that we are all rowing in the same direction.

Compliance with ethical standards

The author declares no potential conflicts of interest.

The research has not involved human participants and/or animals.

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Xira Ruiz-Campillo: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

Declaration of Generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

The author declares that no use of generative AI or any AI-assisted technologies has been made in the writing process.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data Availability

Data will be made available on request.

Annex I. Requests in COP statements

	COP 23 FLJI (2017)	COP 24 KATOWICE (2018)	COP 25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)	COP 26 GLASGOW (2021)	COP 27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022)	COP 28 DUBAI (2023)
G77 + China	1) Design facilitative dialogue (***) 2) Work on L&D (***) 3) Financial support for the WIM (**) 4) Clarify eligibility criteria from the GEF and GCF (**) 5) Progress in finance-related items (**) 6) Advance on adaptation communication guidance (*)	1) Called for upholding the CBDR-RC in the outcome (***)	1) Art. 6 should reflect diversity of NDCs (*) 2) Avoid double counting (*) 3) Predictable funds for adaptation (**) 4) SCF to present a report on achievement of USD100 billion (*) 5) Long term finance (**)	1) Called on developed countries to reduce emissions and scale up provision of support (**) 2) Need for commitment to US\$ 100 billion (**) 3) Need of transparency of support (***)	1) Institutional structure and modalities for L&D assistance (***) 2) Delivering on US\$ 100b to rebuild trust (**) 3) Global goal on adaptation (***)	1) Capitalization of the L&D Fund (***)
AOSIS	2) Progress on loss and damage (***) 7) Establish a 5-year program on L&D (***) 3) Support for the WIM (**) 8) Accelerate finance flows to SIDS (***) 9) Expert groups under WIM Excom (***)	2) COP decision on Talanoa Dialogue outcome (***)	6) Art. 6 needs to reform climate finance landscape, including L&D (*) 7) Stress importance of adaptation finance (***)	4) Called for a formal platform to take stock of gap to the 1.5°C (*) 5) Major economies to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2023 (**) 6) Financial support for L&D (that should be additional to US\$ 100b) (**)	4) References to phase out fossil fuels (***)	2) Called for agreement on a robust framework for the global goal on adaptation, keeping SIDS in mind (***)
African Group	10) Identify new collective goal on finance (*)	3) Full operationalization of Paris Agreement Article 9.5 (***)	8) Importance of grant-based resources to avoid increasing the developing countries' debt burden (***)	7) Consideration of Africa's special needs and circumstances (*) 8) Called for reaching agreement on the operationalization of global goal on adaptation (***) 9) New finance goal at COP27 (*) 10) Transparency package (***)	3) Called for scaling up adaptation action (***) 5) New, additional, predictable, grant-based finance (***) 6) Progress on US\$ 100 billion (***)	3) Adaptation finance for the Paris Agreement (**) 4) For developed countries to provide finance for losses and damages experienced in developing countries (***)
AILAC	1) Design 2018 facilitative dialogue (***) 11) Adopt gender action plan (***) 12) Support work on emerging issues such as oceans, health (*) 13) Support work on emerging issues such as indigenous peoples (***)	4) Consideration of countries' special circumstances (***)	9) Ensure environmental integrity (*) 2) Avoid double counting (*) 10) For developed countries to increase funding channeled through the GCF and GEF (**)	9) New collective finance goal (*) 11) Operationalization of Santiago Network on L&D (***)	7) Results on L&D (***)	N/A
LMDC	14) Commitments on finance, technology transfer, capacity building, loss and damage (**) 15) Agreement to CBDR and flexibility (*)	5) Constructive engagement by developed countries on finance and tech transfer (**)	11) Transparency for developed countries regarding implementation (**) 12) Cooperative approaches (***) 13) Depoliticizing the flow of financial resources (*)	2) Commitment to fulfill the US\$ 100 billion (**)	8) Deepening climate injustice (**) 9) Definition of climate finance (**) 10) Doubling of adaptation finance (***) 11) Operationalization of Santiago Network (***)	5) Evidence that the US \$ 100 billion pledge has been achieved (**)

(***) clear references/solutions to this issue; (**) the issue will be discussed / it's mentioned in the decision; (*) no references made in decision. Source: Author's own elaboration

Annex II. COP decisions

Item	COP 23 FLJI (2017)	COP 24 KATOWICE (2018)	COP 25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)	COP 26 GLASGOW (2021)	COP 27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022)	COP 28 DUBAI (2023)
1	Decision 1/CP.23 (II.10): Welcomes with appreciation the design	Decision 3/CMA.1 (...) the Agreement will be implemented to	Not mentioned.	Decision 1/CMA.3 26. Emphasizes the urgent need for Parties to increase	Decision 12/CMA.4 It establishes the Santiago network for L&D. Decision	Decision 5/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding

(continued on next page)

(continued)

Item	COP 23 FLJI (2017)	COP 24 KATOWICE (2018)	COP 25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)	COP 26 GLASGOW (2021)	COP 27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022)	COP 28 DUBAI (2023)
	of the 2018 facilitative dialogue, to be known as the Talanoa Dialogue.	reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.		their efforts to collectively reduce emissions (...). 37. Invites Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane.	includes an institutional structure (secretariat, advisory network), and funds to support technical assistance.	arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage.
2	Decision 5/CP.23. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. 13. Encourages parties to actively engage in the work and to disseminate, promote and make use of the products of the WIM (...).	Decision 1/CP.24 V. Talanoa dialogue 31. Expresses its appreciation to the Presidents (...) for their leadership in the organization, conduct and conclusion of the Talanoa Dialogue. The Presidents of COP23 and COP24 issued a non-binding Talanoa Dialogue call for action.	Not mentioned.	Decision 1/CMA.3 44. Notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (...) has not yet been met. 46. Urges developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently.	Decision 1/CP.27 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan 36. Expresses serious concern that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (...) has not yet been met and urges developed country Parties to meet the goal.	Decision 2/CMA.5 Global goal on adaptation 28. Also reaffirms that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account (...) needs of developing country Parties, especially (...) small island developing State.
3	Decision 5/CP.23. WIM for L&D. Request to Secretariat to open dialogue that includes finance.	Decision 12/CMA.1 Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement.	Decision 1/CMA.2 16. Urges developed country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation. Decision 6/CMA.2 3. Welcomes the Board's decision confirming that the current Green Climate Fund modalities enable support for (...) adaptation-related elements of the Paris Agreement.	Decision 1/CMA.3 78. (...) welcomes with appreciation the completion of the Paris Agreement work programme, including the adoption of decisions on the following: b) Methodological issues relating to the enhanced transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. Annex / IV Reporting: Provide (...) a biennial transparency report.	Decision 3/CMA.4 Glasgow-Sharm el -Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/ CMA.3.	Decision /CMA.5 Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation. 26. Welcomes progress in the provision of climate finance, while noting with concern that the current provision of climate finance for adaptation remains insufficient.
4	Decision 9/CP.23 (7): Requests the Board to ensure that all developing country Parties have access to all the financial instruments available through the Green Climate Fund, in line with the eligibility criteria referred to in the governing instrument and relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.	Decision 4/CMA.1 4. Recalls that the LDC and SIDS may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emission development reflecting their special circumstances in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement.	Decision 1/CP.25 11. Recalls the commitment made by developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020.	Not mentioned.	Decision 1/CP.27 16. Calls upon Parties to accelerate the development (...) to transition towards low-emission energy systems (...) including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.	Draft decision -/CP.28 -/CMA.5 Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage.
5	Decision 6/CP.23 on Long-term finance. 1. Welcomes with appreciation the continued progress of developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion annually by 2020.	Decision 11/CMA.1 3. Encourages institutional arrangements related to finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building (...). Decision 1/CP.24 15. Recognizes the urgent need to enhance the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support by developed country Parties, in a predictable manner, to enable enhanced action	Decision 2/CMA.2 31. Also recognizes the urgency of enhancing the mobilization of action and support, including finance (...) for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable (...). 32, 33, 34. Urges scaling-up of action, including funding, for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable. Funding can come from private and non-governmental organizations, bilateral, multilateral (...).	Decision 1/CMA.3 36. Calls upon Parties to (...) rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.	Decision 1/CMA.4 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan 58. Emphasizes that (...) scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation for vulnerable regions, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy. 61. Calls on the shareholders of multilateral development banks (...), ensure simplified access and mobilize climate finance (...) from grants to	FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17 Draft decision 80. Notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation was not met (...) welcomes the ongoing efforts of developed country Parties towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year.

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Item	COP 23 FLJI (2017)	COP 24 KATOWICE (2018)	COP 25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)	COP 26 GLASGOW (2021)	COP 27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022)	COP 28 DUBAI (2023)
		by developing country Parties.			guarantees and non-debt instruments. Decision 13/CP.27 Long-term climate finance 5. Welcomes recent pledges made to several funds. 7. Reiterates the need for grant-based resources in developing countries (...).	
6	Not mentioned.		Not mentioned.	Decision 1/CMA.3 63. Reiterates the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance (...) for (...) loss and damage. 73. Decides to establish the Glasgow Dialogue between Parties, relevant organizations and stakeholders to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. Not mentioned.	Decision 1/CP.27 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan Footnote 11 informs of the Standing Committee on Finance. 2022. Report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year (...).	
7	Decision 5/CP.23 (4, 5): 4. Notes the flexible five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee, which enables the timely consideration of cross-cutting issues and current, urgent and emerging needs. 5. Also notes that the Executive Committee will evaluate progress made towards implementing its five-year rolling workplan in 2020 and at regular intervals at subsequent meetings of the Executive Committee.		Decision 1/CP.25 14. Recalls that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation. Decision 1/CMA.2 17. Recalls that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation.		Decision 2/CP.27 Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage. Decision 11/CP.27 Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing L&D. Decision 12/CP.27 Report of the Ex. Com. of the WIM.	
8	Decision 9/CP.23 2. Notes with appreciation the significant scaling-up of the operations of the Green Climate Fund in 2017, including (...) USD 41.8 million (...) two thirds of which are in the least developed countries, small island developing States (...). Decision 10/CP.23 9. (...) invites the Global Environment Facility to further consider ways to improve its access modalities for developing country Parties, including small island developing States and the least developed countries.		Decision 1/CMA.2 17. Recalls that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies (...) especially those that are particularly vulnerable (...) considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.	Decision 1/CMA.3 11. Recognizes the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and welcomes the launch of the comprehensive two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation.	Decision 1/CP.27 Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems (...) and also noting the importance of ‘climate justice’, when taking action to address climate change.	
9	Decision 5/CP.23 6. Requests the Executive Committee to include in its annual reports, as appropriate,		Not mentioned.	Not mentioned.	Decision 5/CMA.4 Adoption of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance. It contains several items	

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Item	COP 23 FLJI (2017)	COP 24 KATOWICE (2018)	COP 25 CHILE-MADRID (2019)	COP 26 GLASGOW (2021)	COP 27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022)	COP 28 DUBAI (2023)
	more detailed information on the work undertaken by its expert groups, subcommittees (...). 9. Requests the secretariat, under the guidance of the Executive Committee (...) to organize (...) an expert dialogue to explore a wide range of information, inputs and views on ways for facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise (...).				including discussions on possible options of finance, technical expert dialogue, etc.	
10	Not mentioned.		FCCC/CP/2019/13/Add.1 Annex 52. Each Annex II Party shall provide information on the financial support that it has disbursed and committed for the purpose of assisting non-Annex I Parties to mitigate GHG emissions (...), including, as appropriate, the following: The Global Environment Facility (...) the Green Climate Fund.	FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1 Annex. Reporting Several mentions on the need for transparency reports.	Decision 18.CMA.4 Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund It includes numerous new pledges for the fund.	
11	Decision 3/CP.23 Establishment of a gender action plan.		Decision 1(CP.25 11. Recalls the commitment made by developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (...).	Decision 1/CMA.3 66. Welcomes the further operationalization of the Santiago Network.	Decision 1/CMA.4 47. Further welcomes the adoption of decisions 11/CP.27 and 12/CMA.4, establishing the institutional arrangements of the Santiago Network (...) to enable its full operationalization.	
12	Not mentioned.		Decision 9/CMA.2 Foot note 2 mentions draft decision text on guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in art. 6.			
13	Decision 2/CP.23 Local communities and indigenous peoples platform.		Not mentioned.			
14	Decision 5/CP.23 9. Requests the secretariat (...) to organize (...) an expert dialogue to explore a wide range of information, inputs and views on ways for facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise (...), including finance, technology and capacity-building, for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects					

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	of climate change (...). 20. Encourages the Executive Committee to collaborate with other bodies under the Convention (...) to continue considering ways of facilitating the mobilization and securing of expertise, and the enhancement of support, including finance, technology and capacity-building (...).					
15	Not mentioned.					

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