



## EXAMINING INDONESIA'S BOLD MOVE ON TURKISH MADE MISSILE PROCUREMENT

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### **Abstract:**

Indonesia has taken a bold step in its arms procurement strategy, particularly during the final strategic planning phase of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme between 2019 and 2024. During this period, it acquired the medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) HISAR-O, the anti-ship missile (AShM) Atmaca, and the long-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) Bora, all of which are manufactured by Turkey. This marked Indonesia's first ever purchase of Turkish-made missiles, simultaneously positioning Indonesia as the first foreign buyer of these systems outside of Turkey. This article employs the Opportunity and Willingness Framework to analyse the decision-making process, while the research methodology is based on Causal Process Tracing (CPT). The article's central argument is that Indonesia's bold decision was driven by a convergence of opportunity shaped by the international structural environment and willingness stemming from domestic factors within Indonesia.

**Keywords:** Arms Trade; Indonesia; Türkiye; Missile; Opportunity & Willingness Framework

**Titulo en Español:** *Análisis de la audaz decisión de Indonesia de adquirir misiles de fabricación turca*

### **Resumen:**

*Indonesia ha dado un paso audaz en su estrategia de adquisición de armamento, especialmente durante la fase final de planificación estratégica del programa «Fuerza Mínima Imprescindible» (MEF), entre 2019 y 2024. Durante este periodo, adquirió el misil tierra-aire (SAM) de medio alcance HISAR-O, el misil antibuque (AShM) Atmaca y el misil tierra-tierra (SSM) de largo alcance Bora, todos ellos fabricados por Turquía. Esto supuso la primera compra de misiles de fabricación turca por parte de Indonesia, lo que situó al país como el primer comprador extranjero de estos sistemas fuera de Turquía. Este artículo emplea el Marco de Oportunidad y Disposición para analizar el proceso de toma de decisiones, mientras que la metodología de investigación se basa en el Rastreo de Procesos Causales (CPT). El argumento central del artículo es que esta audaz decisión fue impulsada por una convergencia de oportunidades moldeadas por el entorno estructural internacional y factores internos.*

**Palabras Clave:** Comercio de armas, Indonesia, Turquía, misiles, marco de oportunidades y motivación

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## 1. Introduction

Indonesia and Türkiye are two nations with a long history of diplomatic relations. Türkiye was among the first countries to recognize Indonesia's independence and has maintained diplomatic ties since 1950. The close bilateral relationship between the two countries became more evident in 2011 when Indonesia and Türkiye agreed to elevate their relationship to a Strategic Partnership<sup>2</sup>. During the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali in 2022, Indonesia and Türkiye further strengthened their cooperation by establishing the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council<sup>3</sup>. These agreements have deepened ties between Jakarta and Ankara across various sectors, including defense.

The strong relations and intensive cooperation between Indonesia and Türkiye in the defense sector are reflected in at least two key aspects. First, the two countries signed a defense industry cooperation agreement in 2010<sup>4</sup>. This agreement was subsequently ratified by the Indonesian Parliament through Law No. 19 of 2014 on the ratification of the Indonesia-Türkiye defense industry cooperation agreement<sup>5</sup>. Following the enactment of this law, bilateral defense cooperation, particularly in the defense industry sector, has intensified. Several collaborative defense industry projects have been undertaken, including the joint development of the Medium Tank Harimau or Kaplan between PT. Pindad and FNSS Türkiye<sup>6</sup> and the joint production of military radio communication equipment between PT. LEN and Aselsan<sup>7</sup>.

Beyond defense industry cooperation, the strengthening of bilateral relations is also evident in Indonesia's increasing procurement of Turkish-made weaponry. Although Türkiye was not traditionally recognized as a major global defense technology producer, its defense industry has made significant advancements over the past few decades. Türkiye is now capable of producing sophisticated military technologies, such as the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) Anka, the Main Battle Tank Altay, and various missile systems<sup>8</sup>. In line with Türkiye's defense industry progress, Indonesia, which has been striving to modernize its defense posture through the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) program, has procured major weapon system produced by Turkish defense technologies.

According to data compiled by the author from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Indonesia began importing major weapon system from Türkiye during the latter part of the MEF Strategic Plan<sup>9</sup>. During this phase, spanning 2019–2024,

<sup>2</sup> Relations between Türkiye and Indonesia, at <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-indonesia.en.mfa>

<sup>3</sup> ANTARA: "Indonesia Committed to Intensifying Cooperation with Turkey." *ANTARA News*, 2 May 2024, at <https://en.antaranews.com/news/312330/indonesia-committed-to-intensifying-cooperation-with-turkey>.

<sup>4</sup> Detik.com: "Gelar Pertemuan Bilateral, RI-Turki Tanda Tangan 8 MoU Dan Agreement." *Detiknews*, 29 June 2010, at <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1389602/gelar-pertemuan-bilateral-ri-turki-tanda-tangani-8-mou-dan-agreement->.

<sup>5</sup> UU No. 19 tahun 2014 Tentang Pengesahan Persetujuan Kerjasama Industri Pertahanan Indonesia - Turki, at <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/38660>

<sup>6</sup> Triantama, Febry: "Kerjasama Pengembangan Medium Battle Tank Harimau Sebagai Perwujudan Ketahanan Alutsista Tentara Nasional Indonesia.", *Jurnal Ketahanan Nasional*, Vol 26, n° 2 (2020), pp. 273–92.

<sup>7</sup> Len-Aselsan Teken Joint Production Radio Militer HF Dan V/UHF SDR, at <https://www.len.co.id/len-aselsan-teken-joint-production-radio-militer-dan-vuhf-sdr/>.

<sup>8</sup> Bastian, Jens: "Turkey: An Emerging Global Arms Exporter", Centre for Applied Turkey Studies SWP Comments, n° 6 (February 2024), at


[https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2024C06\\_Turkey\\_ArmsExporter.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2024C06_Turkey_ArmsExporter.pdf); IISS: "Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges", IISS Strategic Dossier 2022, at <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2026/mdi-missile-tech-replace/missile-technology-accelerating-challenges-2.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, at <https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferData/transferResults?logic=on>.

Indonesia purchased 12 units of the UCAV Anka and various missile systems<sup>10</sup>. The missiles acquired from Türkiye include the HISAR-O medium-range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), the Atmaca Anti-Ship Missile (AShM), and the Bora long-range Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM)<sup>11</sup>. This acquisition of various missile types from Türkiye represents an intriguing development.

Indonesia’s decision to procure multiple types of missiles from Türkiye is notable for at least two reasons. First, Indonesia has made a bold move by becoming the first country outside Türkiye to purchase these missile systems<sup>12</sup>. This decision has drawn criticism from an Indonesian defense expert due to concerns over the missiles’ operational effectiveness in Indonesia’s environmental conditions<sup>13</sup>. Such concerns are well-founded, as various studies indicate that weather and geographical conditions can influence missile effectiveness. Second, the acquisition of Turkish missiles under the third MEF Strategic Plan marks the first time Indonesia has sourced all its missile purchases from a single country. Previous MEF Strategic Plans show that Indonesia consistently diversified its missile procurement sources, as illustrated in the following graph based on SIPRI data processed by the author<sup>14</sup>.

**Figure 1. Indonesia’s Missile Supplier in Minimum Essential Forces Era**



Source: Author’s own elaboration based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

Due to the long-standing historical relationship between Indonesia and Türkiye, which in recent years has also encompassed arms procurement and defense industry cooperation, several studies have examined this topic. However, existing literature on Indonesia-Türkiye arms procurement and defense industry collaboration has primarily focused on other case studies,

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Basundoro, Alfin: “Indonesia Must Rethink Its Defense Cooperation with China”, *East Asia Forum*, 24 July 2024, at <https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/07/24/indonesia-must-rethink-its-defence-cooperation-with-china/>; Rahmat, Ridzwan: “Indonesia Awards Contract for 45 Atmaca Anti-Ship Missile Rounds”, *Janes*, 25 January 2024, at <https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defense-news/industry/indonesia-awards-contract-for-45-atmaca-anti-ship-missile-rounds>.

<sup>12</sup> SIPRI, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Mawangi, Genta Tenri: “Ahli: Indonesia Jangan Jadi Lab Lapangan Produk Alutsista Asing”, *ANTARA News*, 26 March 2024, at <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/4030056/ahli-indonesia-jangan-jadi-lab-lapangan-produk-alutsista-asing>.

<sup>14</sup> SIPRI, *op. cit.*



such as the development of the Harimau Medium Battle Tank <sup>15</sup> and the Bayraktar TB2 UAV <sup>16</sup>.

Literature on Indonesia's arms procurement and defense industry cooperation can be categorized into two main discussions. The first category consists of studies that focus on the defense aspect. These studies argue that arms procurement not only serves to strengthen Indonesia's defense posture <sup>17</sup> through defense transformation <sup>18</sup> but is also frequently used as an instrument of Indonesia's defense diplomacy <sup>19</sup>. Park and Thakkar (2024) explain that the gap between the purchasing country's needs and the specifications offered by first-tier arms-producing countries has led Indonesia to procure weapons from second-tier producers such as South Korea and Türkiye <sup>20</sup>.

In addition to studies analyzing Indonesia's arms procurement from a defense perspective, there is also literature that examines this issue through a political economy lens. All studies in this category emphasize the crucial role of offset agreements in Indonesia's arms procurement contracts. The offset scheme mandated by the Indonesian government is intended to ensure that foreign arms purchases contribute to enhancing the domestic defense industry's capabilities <sup>21</sup>.

Although existing literature has provided various insights into Indonesia's arms procurement, gaps remain that this study seeks to address. To date, no studies have explained the factors that led the Indonesian government to make the bold decision to procure various

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<sup>15</sup> Triantama, "Kerjasama Pengembangan Medium Battle Tank Harimau Sebagai Perwujudan Ketahanan Alutsista Tentara Nasional Indonesia."

<sup>16</sup> Abdad, Muhammad Yasir: "Drone Bayraktar TB2 Sebagai Instrumen Diplomasi Pertahanan Internasional Turki.", *Global Political Studies Journal*, Vol. 6, n° 2 (2022), pp. 135–152.

<sup>17</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A: "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 32, n° 1 (2010), pp. 50–69.; Laksmana, Evan A (2018): "Why Is Southeast Asia Rearming? An Empirical Assessment", in *U.S. Policy in Asia—Perspectives for the Future*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, pp.106–37.; Collin, Koh Swee Lean: "What next for the Indonesian Navy? Challenges and Prospects for Attaining the Minimum Essential Force by 2024", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 37, n° 3 (2015), pp. 432–462.

<sup>18</sup> Dzikri, Ilman: "Negara Dan Kapasitas Adopsi Inovasi: Studi Kasus Tranformasi Pertahanan Indonesia Periode 1998-2014", *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, Vol. 18, n° 2 (2016), pp. 131–51.

<sup>19</sup> Amrullah, Muhammad Rizky: "Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Terhadap Turki: Studi Kasus Kerjasama Industri Pertahanan", *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara*, Vol. 6, n° 1 (2016), pp. 151–68.; Dilahwangsa, Zulfikar; Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa and Pedrason, Rodon. "ASEAN Defense Industrial Collaboration (ADIC) Sebagai Media Diplomasi Pertahanan Negara Anggota ASEAN", *Jurnal Diplomasi Pertahanan*, Vol. 5, n° 3 (2019), pp. 1–28.; Gindarsah, Iis: "Strategic Hedging in Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy", *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 32, n° 4 (2016), pp. 336–53.; Hidayat, Safril: "Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia : Amalgam Militer-Sipil Indonesia Defense Diplomacy : Civil-Military Amalgams", *Jurnal Pertahanan*, Vol. 4, n° 2 (2014), pp. 25–52.; Sulaiman, Yohanes: "Peran Diplomasi Pertahanan Dalam Pengadaan Alutsista: Studi Kasus Pengadaan Helikopter Angkut Berat TNI", *Jurnal Pertahanan*, Vol. 6, n° 3 (2016), pp. 91–116.; Abdad, "Drone Bayraktar TB2 Sebagai Instrumen Diplomasi Pertahanan Internasional Turki."

<sup>20</sup> Park, Soul and Thakkar, Chirayu. "Filling the Weapons Procurement Gap in the Indo-Pacific: South Korean Arms Exports to India and Indonesia", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 46, n° 3 (2025), pp. 613–640.

<sup>21</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A (2011): "Offsets and Defense Industrialization in Indonesia and Singapore", in *Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets*, New York, Routledge, pp. 249–63.; Indrawan, Raden Mas Jerry and Widiyanto, Bayu: "Offset Policy in Building State Defense Independence" *Jurnal Pertahanan*, Vol. 6, n° 2 (2016), pp. 29–50.; Maharani, Curie and Matthews, Ron: "The Role of Offset in the Enduring Gestation of Indonesia's Strategic Industries", *Defense and Peace Economics*, Vol. 34, n° 7 (2023), pp. 981–1002.; Susdarwono, Endro Tri: "Political Economy of the Procurement of the Changbogo Submarine Alutsista in the Framework of Towards and Independent Process for the Indonesian Defense Industry" *Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Terapan*, Vol. 4, n° 2 (2019), pp. 70–84.; Tippe, Syarifudin: "Deffense Offset Policy in Indonesia", *International Journal of Administrative Science & Organization*, Vol. 20, n° 2 (2013), pp. 85–89.



types of missiles from Türkiye, making Indonesia the first buyer of these systems. Therefore, this article aims to answer this question using the Opportunity and Willingness framework.

## **2. Analytical Framework: Opportunity and Willingness**

Opportunity and willingness constitute a framework first developed by Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr in their book titled “Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics” in 1989. This framework was designed to serve as a structure for analysing state behaviour in international politics<sup>22</sup>. It enables researchers to investigate the reasons behind a country's policies or behaviour from both macro (structural) and micro perspectives<sup>23</sup>. Over time, this framework has been extensively utilized by scholars to analyse various phenomena in international politics, such as conflicts, foreign policy, and the development of national defense industries.

Kylie A. Joyce, Faten Ghosn, and Reşat Bayer employed the opportunity and willingness framework to elucidate factors influencing third-party decisions to engage in conflicts<sup>24</sup>. Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr applied the opportunity and willingness framework in the study of state foreign policies<sup>25</sup>. Additionally, the same framework has been used to analyse the motivations or reasons behind third-world countries' development of their national defense industries<sup>26</sup>. Richard A. I. Johnson, in his article, utilized the opportunity and willingness framework to analyse state decisions to change their arms technology suppliers<sup>27</sup>.

As its name suggests, this framework employs two variables in its analysis, which are not only interrelated but also integrated to enable a policy to occur. In other words, if there is only opportunity without willingness, or vice versa, willingness without opportunity, a state is unlikely to act<sup>28</sup>. Opportunity refers to the macro aspect, namely the external or structural conditions that affect a state's ability to act<sup>29</sup>. The existing international structural conditions determine whether a state has the capability or opportunity to adopt a particular policy. When the international structure is unsupportive, the state will not pursue that policy. In other words, this factor creates constraints and opportunities that influence state actions in the international arena.

In the context of arms acquisition and defense industry cooperation, geopolitics becomes a highly influential structural factor. Geopolitical aspects have long been recognized as influential in the arms technology market. For instance, during the Cold War, arms trade occurred between countries within the same alliance bloc<sup>30</sup>. After the end of the Cold War, although not absolute, arms technology trade and defense industry cooperation continue to be

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<sup>22</sup> Most, Benjamin A. and Starr, Harvey (1989): *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Joyce, Kyle A.; Ghosn, Faten and Bayer, Reşat: “When and Whom to Join: The Expansion of Ongoing Violent Interstate Conflicts”, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, n° 1 (2013), pp. 205–238.

<sup>25</sup> Papadakis, Maria and Starr, Harvey (1987): “Opportunity, Willingness and Small States: The Relationship between Environment and Foreign Policy.”, in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston, George Allen and Unwin, pp. 409–432.

<sup>26</sup> Kinsella, David. “Arms Production in the Third Tier: An Analysis of Opportunity and Willingness.” *International Interactions*, Vol. 26, n° 3 (2000), pp. 253–86.

<sup>27</sup> Johnson, Richard A.I.: “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007.” *Defense and Peace Economics*, Vol. 31, n° 7 (2020), pp. 851–868.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*; Joyce, at al., *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> Starr, Harvey: “Opportunity and Willingness as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War.” *International Interactions*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1978), pp. 363–387.

<sup>30</sup> Johnson, *op. cit.*



influenced by political proximity or alliance similarity<sup>31</sup>. An example is the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) implemented by the United States<sup>32</sup>. Besides influencing the policies of arms technology-producing countries, geopolitical factors can also affect the characteristics of the global arms market<sup>33</sup>.

Meanwhile, willingness refers to the micro aspect or internal factors that influence a state's desire or preference to act in the face of available opportunities<sup>34</sup>. In the context of arms acquisition, it is necessary to consider the buyer state's ambition to enhance its defense posture and achieve autarky<sup>35</sup>. When attempting to explain why states decide to procure weapons from second-tier suppliers, Park and Thakkar (2024) argue that the compatibility of weapon technology with strategic and technical needs, as well as defense doctrines, is a determining factor in a state's decision to select the weapon systems to be acquired<sup>36</sup>.

### 3. Research Method

The study was carried out using a qualitative methodology. Qualitative research, as defined by Christopher Lamont (2015), is research that uses non-numerical strategies or techniques for collecting and analyzing data, often relying on the use of words<sup>37</sup>. The data used in this research comprise both primary and secondary sources. Primary data are derived from government-issued documents, as well as official statements made public through press releases or government websites. Documents encompass written, visually perceptible, or audible content conveyed through various means of communication<sup>38</sup>. Secondary data is collected from a review of literature, newspapers, online media, and existing research published in credible academic journals and scientific studies. The data analysis methodology used by the author in this study is Causal Process Tracing (CPT). Blatter and Haverland define CPT as a methodological framework consisting of two core components: configurative thinking and causal configuration. The main goal of CPT is to determine the circumstances that trigger particular events<sup>39</sup>. Selecting CPT as the data analysis method is in line with the research objective, which involves investigating the motivations or reasons that drove Indonesia's decision to procure missiles manufactured by the Turkish defense industries.

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<sup>31</sup> Devore, Marc R and Stai, Nora Kristine: "When Collaboration Works", *European Review of International Studies*, Vol. 6, n° 2 (2019), pp. 18–42.; Moon, Terry; Fewell, Suzanne and Reynolds, Hayley: "The What, Why, When and How of Interoperability." *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 24, n° 1 (2008), pp. 5–17.; Ringsmose, Jens: "Investing in Fighters and Alliances: Norway, Denmark, and the Bumpy Road to the Joint Strike Fighter", *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, Vol. 68, n° 1 (2012), pp. 93–110.; Güven, Serhat and Yanık Lerna K.: "Turkey's involvement in the F-35 program: One step forward, two steps backward?", *International Journal*, Vol. 68, n° 1 (2012), pp. 111–29.

<sup>32</sup> Triantama, Febry; Berliana, Cancera Triane and I'za, Muhammad Yusril: "The Failure of the United States Coercive Diplomacy in the Era of President Donald Trump: Turkey's Persistence in Buying S-400." *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan Dan Politik*, Vol. 35, n° 1 (2022), pp. 58–68.

<sup>33</sup> Johnson, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> Starr *op. cit.*; Most and Starr, *op. cit.*; Kinsella *op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> Kinsella *op. cit.*; Bitzinger, "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions" *op. cit.* Bitzinger, Richard A: "Defense Industries in Asia and the Technonationalist Impulse" *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 36, n° 3 (2015), pp. 453–72.; Neuman, Stephanie G: "Power, Influence, and Hierarchy: Defense Industries in a Unipolar World.", *Defense and Peace Economics*, Vol. 21, n° 1 (2010), pp. 105–134.

<sup>36</sup> Park and Thakkar, *op. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> Lamont, Christopher (2015): *Research Methods in Politics and International Relations*. London, Sage Publications.

<sup>38</sup> Neuman, William Lawrence (2004): *Basics of Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Boston, Pearson.

<sup>39</sup> Blatter, Joachim and Haverland, Markus (2012): *Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.



## 4. Findings

### 4.1 Türkiye Detoriating Relations with The Global North

Türkiye occupies a distinct geographical location, situated at the boundary between Europe and Asia, two separate continents. Most of Türkiye's territory lies in Asia, yet historically, the country has seen itself as a transatlantic power. This is clear in its choice to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Türkiye was one of the first countries to join NATO when the alliance was still forming, and it officially became a member in 1952<sup>40</sup>. In line with this orientation, Türkiye sought to integrate itself with Europe by establishing institutional ties with the European Economic Community. This objective was formalized through the formal application for association in 1959, followed by Ankara Agreement in 1963, which granted associate member status and created a legal framework for integration, and was later reinforced by Türkiye's formal application for full membership in 1987.<sup>41</sup>

The trajectory to becoming a full member got more complex following the transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Union in 1993, which marked a qualitative deepening of European integration beyond economic cooperation into political governance, security, justice, and citizenship. Within this more comprehensive and normatively demanding framework, formal accession negotiations with Türkiye commenced in 2005<sup>42</sup>. This institutional and normative expansion raised the threshold for accession and intensified debates within Türkiye, where some scholars and public questioned whether full membership aligned with the country's historical identity, structural capacities and domestic politics dynamics<sup>43</sup>.

From the period of the Cold War to the early 2000s, Türkiye maintained strong connections with the group of developed countries known as the Global North<sup>44</sup>. But, over the past few years, Türkiye's ties to the more developed nations of the world – especially the United States (US) and Europe – have deteriorated significantly. This deterioration in relations is not only limited to the weakening of diplomatic ties between Turkey and the US or Europe but also includes the emergence and strengthening of anti-Western sentiment. Turkey's political elite often makes statements that explicitly show this sentiment. The deterioration of Turkey's relations with the US and Europe occurred in the 2010s and strengthened further after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016<sup>45</sup>. There are at least three factors that contribute to the

<sup>40</sup> Akgül-Açıkmeşe, Sinem and Aksu, Fulya: "Türkiye's Relations with/within NATO: The Ontological Security Dilemmas of Türkiye's Transatlantic Identity", *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 50, n° 4, (2024), pp. 685–703.

<sup>41</sup> Buzan, Barry; and Diez, Thomas: "The European Union and Turkey", *Survival*, Vol. 41, n° 1 (1999), pp. 41–57.; Kahraman, Sevilay Elgün: "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, n° 1 (2000), pp. 1–20.; Park, William: "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki-to Ankara?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 5 n° 3 (2000), pp. 31–53.; Yilmaz, Hakan: "Euro-scepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 16, n° 1 (2011), pp. 185–208.

<sup>42</sup> Müftüler-Baç, Meltem: "A Fragile Relationship: Turkey and the European Union Moving beyond Membership with External Differentiated Integration." *West European Politics*, Vol. 48, n° 5 (2025), pp. 1186–1215.

<sup>43</sup> Gökay, Bülent: "Turkey: Swinging Pendulum Away from the European Union, 2005-2022", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, n° 5 (2024), pp. 681–97.; Yilmaz, *op. cit.*

<sup>44</sup> Levaggi, Ariel González and Donelli, Federico: "Turkey's Changing Engagement with the Global South." *International Affairs*, Vol. 97, n° 4 (2021), pp. 1105–24.

<sup>45</sup> Gönenç, Defne; Fouskas, Vasileios; Huang, Qingan and Ünlüsoy, Sinan: "Political economy of Turkey's pivot to Asia", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 25, n° 5 (2024), pp. 857–881; Kaliber, Alper. and Kaliber, Esra: "From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux", *International Spectator*, Vol. 54, n° 4 (2019), pp. 1–16.; Üngör, Çağdaş: "Turkey's Asia Anew initiative: the limits of middle power activism?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 46, n° 4 (2025), pp. 429–445.



deterioration of relations and the strengthening of anti-Western sentiment in Türkiye's foreign policy.

The first factor influencing the worsening of Türkiye's relations with the US and Europe is Türkiye's domestic political dynamics. Since winning the election for the first time in 2002, the AKP, a political party with an Islamist ideology, has brought about changes in Türkiye's foreign policy. Since the AKP's leadership began, Turkey's foreign policy has started to change through "de-Europeanisation", encouraging Turkey to engage in multi-directional diplomacy and assertive regionalism<sup>46</sup>. At this time, a view began to emerge from the AKP elite that Turkey was not gaining any real benefit from continuing its foreign policy as a bridge between Europe and Asia. However, at this moment, anti-Western sentiment had not yet emerged, and Turkey's relations with the US and Europe had not deteriorated.

Significant changes only occurred when entering the second decade of the AKP regime after the landslide victory obtained in the 2011 parliamentary elections<sup>47</sup>. The AKP regime's power then shifted from being previously democratic and promoting liberalisation for Turkey's economic progress to a more authoritarian government. Changes in the character of the AKP regime have impacted Turkey's foreign policy<sup>48</sup>. In this second decade, anti-Western sentiment emerged and strengthened<sup>49</sup>. Furthermore, the Arab Spring events that occurred around the same time showed the differences in views and interests between Turkey and the US and Europe<sup>50</sup>. In his speech during the 2014 presidential election campaign, Erdogan explicitly stated that Turkey is now different from the "Old Turkey" that only submitted to the wishes and interests of the Western world<sup>51</sup>.

The influence of domestic politics became increasingly apparent after the failed coup attempt in 2016. The alleged coup attempt against President Erdogan by a faction supporting Fethullah Gulen pushed Turkey further away from the US and Europe. This is because Gulen and his domestic supporters are often referred to as a group close to the US or the Western world. Therefore, Erdogan views the coup attempt against him as related to the US. Furthermore, at the time of this coup attempt, China firmly declared its support for the Erdogan regime and the AKP<sup>52</sup>. This support from China further brought Erdogan and Turkey closer to China while distancing them from the US and Europe.

Secondly, following the end of the Cold War, the alliance between Türkiye and both the United States and NATO began to deteriorate. As a NATO member during the Cold War era, Türkiye consistently demonstrated its loyalty as a key ally of the United States. The alignment was primarily motivated by the significant threat posed by the Soviet Union, prompting Türkiye to form strong bonds with the United States in order to secure their defense guarantees<sup>53</sup>. Moreover, Türkiye remained committed to its aspirations of joining the European Economic Community (EEC). Establishing ties outside of NATO during the Cold War would have put Türkiye's security at risk and potentially undermined its chances of integrating with the EEC. The conclusion of the Cold War offered Türkiye the chance to pursue alliances with countries

<sup>46</sup> Kaliber and Kaliber, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Kaliber and Kaliber, *op. cit.*; Gonenc. et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>48</sup> Özdamar, Ö., and Artıkoğlu, L.: "Turkey's quest for assertive foreign policy roles: the elite vs. the audience", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 27, n° 1 (2026), pp. 23–44.

<sup>49</sup> Kaliber and Kaliber, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Ozdamar & Artıkoğlu, *op. cit.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Gonenc. et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> Buhari Gulmez, Didem: "The Resilience of the US–Turkey Alliance: Divergent Threat Perceptions and Worldviews." *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 26, n° 4 (2020), pp. 475–92.; Öniş, Ziya and Yılmaz, Şuhnaz: "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, n° 1 (2009), pp. 7–24.



that could provide strategic and long-term benefits outside the US and NATO. Türkiye's widening partnerships beyond NATO membership also exacerbated its strained ties with NATO and the Global North due to a growing feeling in Türkiye that it could no longer entirely count on the United States and NATO for support of its national interests<sup>54</sup>.

Despite concerns about the dependability of the United States and NATO, internal NATO factors have contributed to Türkiye's growing divergence from the Global North. Over the past few years, Türkiye's ties with NATO, especially with the US, have grown increasingly strained. A major point of disagreement centered around Türkiye's choice to procure the S-400 medium-range air defense missile system from Russia<sup>55</sup>. The purchase received intense criticism and disapproval from the United States and other NATO member countries<sup>56</sup>. Türkiye went ahead with the acquisition, citing its national interests as justification. The US responded by taking Türkiye out of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 program and enforcing sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)<sup>57</sup>. Türkiye's unilateral operations in Syria as well as disputes with Greece<sup>58</sup> and Cyprus<sup>59</sup> also contributed to the perception that it was no longer a reliable US ally<sup>60</sup>, and was becoming a troublesome NATO member<sup>61</sup>.

Thirdly, Türkiye's ongoing inability to secure EU membership has also played a significant role in its increasing distance from the Global North. Türkiye's foreign policy has mainly focused on aligning with the Global North to pave the way for its integration into the EU<sup>62</sup>. However, despite significant efforts, Türkiye's EU accession process after the Cold War

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<sup>54</sup> Roy-Mukherjee, Shampa and Udeogu, Ejike: "Re-Evaluating Turkey's Global Relationships and Its Shift toward the South-East Asian Region.", *Journal of Global Faultlines*, Vol. 10, n° 1 (2023), pp. 88–101.

<sup>55</sup> Triantama, et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> Cirilli, Kevin and Wadhams, Nick: "Pompeo Urges Turkey Not to Make Russian S-400 Operational", *Bloomberg News*, 25 July 2019, at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-25/pompeo-urges-turkey-not-to-make-russian-s-400-operational>; DW, "Turkey Confirms Russia S-400 Missile Deal, Ignores US Warning", *DW News*, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-confirms-russia-s-400-missile-deal-ignores-us-warning/a-49168150>; "Turkey Confirms Russia S-400 Missile Deal, Ignores US Warning." *DW News*, 6 December 2019, at <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-confirms-russia-s-400-missile-deal-ignores-us-warning/a-49168150>.

<sup>57</sup> Triantama, et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>58</sup> Choulis, Ioannis., Mehrl, Marius., & Ifantis, Kostas: "Arms racing, military build-ups and dispute intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish rivalry, 1985–2020", *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 33, n° 7 (2022), pp. 779–805; Koukoudakis, George.: "The failed vision of a Greek–Turkish security community?", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 27, n° 1 (2025), pp. 73–90.; Tziarras, Z.: "Drivers of crisis in the Greek-Turkish protracted conflict: A neoclassical realist reading", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 25, n° 2 (2025), pp. 165–185.

<sup>59</sup> Acikmese, S. A., & Triantaphyllou, D.: "The NATO–EU–Turkey trilogy: The impact of the Cyprus conundrum", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 12, No.4 (2012), pp. 555–573.; Ulusoy, Kivanç: "The Cyprus conflict: Turkey's strategic dilemma", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, n° 4 (2016), pp. 393–406.

<sup>60</sup> Cohen, Jordan; Allen, Jonathan Ellis and Mossad, Nardine: "Turkey Is a US Ally, but Should Not Be a Trusted One." *Cato Institute*, 31 December 2023, at <https://www.cato.org/commentary/turkey-us-ally-should-not-be-trusted-one>; Cook, Steven A: "Neither Friend nor Foe: The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations." *Council of Foreign Relations Special Report*, n° 82 (November 2018), at [https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\\_pdf/CSR82\\_Cook\\_Turkey.pdf](https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR82_Cook_Turkey.pdf); Makovsky, Alan: "Turkey: Managing an Unfriendly Ally." *Brookings Institute Commentary*, 30 October 2024, at <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turkey-managing-an-unfriendly-ally/>.

<sup>61</sup> Crowley, Michael and Erlanger, Steven: "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally", *The New York Times*, 30 May 2022, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html>.

<sup>62</sup> Levaggi and Donelli, *op. cit.*; Roy-Mukherjee and Udeogu, *op. cit.*



has yet to yield the desired outcome<sup>63</sup>. Türkiye's frustration with the West—particularly the United States and the EU—has been exacerbated by the perception that the EU applies double standards in its approach to Türkiye's membership process<sup>64</sup>. Not only at the elite level<sup>65</sup>, but the Turkish public in general also questions the sincerity of the EU in accepting Turkey as a member.<sup>66</sup> However, accession negotiations have been at a standstill since 2018 due to concerns over democratic backsliding and the deterioration of human rights in Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan<sup>67</sup>. The policy of maritime and territorial confrontation that Turkey has adopted in its relations with Greece and Cyprus, both of which are EU members, has also made any progress impossible<sup>68</sup>.

In response to its strained relations with the Global North, Türkiye is now pursuing alternative channels to gain economic access and enhance its political standing and backing. Türkiye's economic growth, coupled with robust political backing, is essential for reclaiming its historical authority<sup>69</sup>. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained power in 2002, Türkiye's foreign policy direction has undergone significant changes. No longer viewing itself as a peripheral state, Türkiye now aims to assert itself as a major player, proactively building connections and exerting its influence in Asia and Africa<sup>70</sup>.

### **3.2. Türkiye Looking to the South Foreign Policy and Asia Anew Initiative**

While Türkiye's relations with the Global North have deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, its ties with the Global South—Asia, Africa, and South America—have grown increasingly strong in recent years. This shift is closely linked to Türkiye's worsening relationship with the Global North, as previously discussed. As noted in the preceding section, under the leadership of the AKP, Türkiye has undergone a significant transformation in its foreign policy vision<sup>71</sup>.

A major shift in Türkiye's foreign policy vision was initiated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. Davutoğlu introduced revisionist and expansionist thinking into Türkiye's foreign policy, with the ambition of establishing Türkiye as a dominant regional power and restructuring its existing international relationships<sup>72</sup>. This foundational foreign policy vision later evolved into an emphasis on Türkiye's strategic

<sup>63</sup> Fidan, Hakan: "Turkish Foreign Policy at the Turn of the 'Century of Türkiye'", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 25, n° 3 (2023), pp. 11–26.; Donelli, Federico (2021): *Turkey in Africa*, London, Bloomsbury Academic.

<sup>64</sup> Fidan, *op. cit.*

<sup>65</sup> Yavuz, Hakan M.: "Erdoğan's Foreign Policy: Strategy Without Doctrine", *E-International Relations*, (March 2025), at <https://www.e-ir.info/2025/03/15/erdogans-foreign-policy-strategy-without-doctrine/>

<sup>66</sup> Gonenc. et al., *op.cit*

<sup>67</sup> Alpan, Basak: "A Pivot or A Saga: How Turkish Foreign Policy is Torn Between Domestic Pressures and Economic Needs", CEPS Explainer, n° 1 (January 2026), at <https://cdn.ceps.eu/2026/01/CEPS-Explainer-2026-01-Alpan-on-Turkish-foreign-policy.pdf>; Fella, Stefano: "Turkey under Erdogan: Recent Developments and the 2023 Elections", *House of Common Library*, n°. 9806 (July 2023), at <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9806/>

<sup>68</sup> Fella, *op. cit.*; Gianotta, Valeria; Cubukcoglu, Serhat Suha and Al Qutbah, Shamma: "Looking at Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Rule", *Trends Research & Advisory*, October 2024, at <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/looking-at-turkish-foreign-policy-under-the-akp-rule/>

<sup>69</sup> Gonenc, et al. *op. cit.*; Donelli, *op. cit.*; Levaggi and Donelli, *op. cit.*

<sup>70</sup> Yeşiltaş, Murat: "The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, n° 4 (2013), pp. 661–687.

<sup>71</sup> Öniş, Ziya and Yilmaz, Şuhnaz: "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, n° 1 (2009), pp. 7–24.; Yeşiltaş, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Özpek, Burak Bilgehan and Yaşar, Nebahat Tanriverdi: "Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey under the AKP Rule", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 19, n° 2 (2018), pp. 198–216.; Taş, Hakkı: "Continuity through Change: Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 43, n° 12 (2022), pp. 2869–2887.; Yeşiltaş, *op. cit.*



autonomy<sup>73</sup> and the pursuit of stronger relations with the Global South, particularly Asia<sup>74</sup>. Beyond its evolving foreign policy vision, Türkiye's growing interest in Asian countries is also driven by broader global shifts. Specifically, the world's center of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to Asia<sup>75</sup>. This is unsurprising given the region's immense strategic value. The South China Sea, at the heart of Southeast Asia, accounted for 21% of global trade in 2016<sup>76</sup>. More specifically, 37% of the world's oil and gas supply passes through this maritime route<sup>77</sup>. Additionally, the region represents a key market for global industries, as it is home to 60% of the world's population<sup>78</sup>.

However, despite Asia's immense market potential for the Turkish industry to tap into, in reality, the Turkish industry does not have access to the Asian market. This is due to Turkey's focus on the European market, which puts it at a disadvantage compared to other industrialised countries that have already established a strong presence in the Asian market.<sup>79</sup> Given these factors, it is unsurprising that Türkiye has demonstrated a strong commitment to enhancing its cooperation with Asian countries. In 2019, Türkiye introduced a policy that underscores its strategic interest in Asia—the Asia Anew Initiative<sup>80</sup>. In his article, Hakan Fidan, Türkiye's Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2023, affirmed that Türkiye recognizes Asia's vast potential and remains committed to expanding cooperation across various sectors<sup>81</sup>. The Asia Anew Initiative has created significant opportunities for Türkiye's collaboration with Asian countries. Türkiye has outlined potential areas of cooperation, particularly with Southeast Asian nations, spanning education, economy, politics, culture, technology, and defense<sup>82</sup>. Türkiye's commitment to fostering these partnerships is evident in several concrete initiatives. In the defense sector, for instance, Türkiye has collaborated with Indonesia on the development of the Harimau/Kaplan Medium Battle Tank<sup>83</sup>. It should be noted that Turkey has sought to enter the Southeast Asian military systems market, beginning with these agreements with Indonesia, which is a key ASEAN member state<sup>84</sup>.

### **3.3. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Strategy and Archipelagic Trident Shield**

Merely concentrating on a nation's arsenal and advanced military equipment is insufficient when discussing national defense matters. There's other key component in every country's defense strategy is the doctrine it uses. In the context of national defense, a country's defense strategy is typically guided by a doctrine that sets the policy guidelines. At the operational and

<sup>73</sup> Yavuz, M. Hakan: "The Motives behind the AKP's Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism and Strategic Autonomy", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 23, n° 5 (2022), pp. 659–80.

<sup>74</sup> Fidan, *op. cit.*; Levaggi and Donelli, *op. cit.*; Roy-Mukherjee and Udeogu, *op. cit.*; Yilmaz, Nuh: "Asia Anew Initiative: Main Aspects of Türkiye's Asia Opening", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 26, n° 1 (2024), pp. 11–21.

<sup>75</sup> Yilmaz, *op. cit.*

<sup>76</sup> Review of Maritime Transport, at <http://unctad.org/rmthttp://unctad.org/transportnews>.

<sup>77</sup> EIA: "Regional Analysis Brief: South China Sea." *EIA*, 21 March 2024, at [https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions\\_of\\_interest/South\\_China\\_Sea/south\\_china\\_sea.pdf](https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf).

<sup>78</sup> UNFPA Population Trends, at <https://asiapacific.unfpa.org/en/topics/population-trends-9>.

<sup>79</sup> Ungor, *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Asia Anew Initiative, at <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/asia-anew-initiative.en.mfa>

<sup>81</sup> Fidan, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> Yilmaz, *op. cit.*; Roy-Mukherjee and Udeogu, *op. cit.*

<sup>83</sup> Hadza, Min; Fadhli, Robby and Boran, Tufan Kutay: "Mapping the Potential of the Strategic Partnerships between Indonesia and Türkiye." *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2024), pp. 255–78.; Triantama, Kerjasama Pengembangan Medium Battle Tank Harimau Sebagai Perwujudan Ketahanan Alutsista Tentara Nasional Indonesia., *op. cit.*

<sup>84</sup> "Will Turkey and Indonesia's defense industry cooperation thrive?", *The Jakarta Post*, 6 March 2025, at <https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/03/06/will-turkey-and-indonesias-defense-industry-cooperation-thrive.html>



tactical levels, doctrine encompasses the methods and military strategies employed to counter adversaries or threats<sup>85</sup>. Each country's doctrine varies in terms of strategy and operational tactics and is not fixed permanently; it changes over time<sup>86</sup>. In Indonesia, defense expert Andi Widjajanto has pointed out in his written work that Indonesia's defense strategy has undergone numerous evolutions and developments<sup>87</sup>.

Despite recent changes, one key component of Indonesia's defense doctrine has persisted: the implementation of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) tenets<sup>88</sup>. Laksmana (2020) notes that the anti-access strategy tenets has been a consistent component of Indonesia's defense doctrine development at each stage<sup>89</sup>. The A2/AD defense strategy consists of interconnected components, as its name implies. The primary objective of Anti-Access is to either prevent enemy forces from entering a designated area or territory or disrupt their operations<sup>90</sup>. Anti-Access is distinct from Area Denial, which aims to diminish the enemy's operational capabilities within the battlefield to varying degrees or completely hinder their movements and activities<sup>91</sup>. The A2/AD strategy functions as a deterrent through denial, influencing the adversary's perception that any aggressive actions are unlikely to achieve success<sup>92</sup>.

The A2/AD strategy is arguably implemented in Indonesia's defense doctrine across multiple areas. The Total War doctrine, which encompasses the entire nation in defense efforts, has been in operation since the independence era. The organisation of all aspects of society as a unified defense against enemy aggression aims to create a perception that successful attacks are highly unlikely<sup>93</sup>. In essence, Indonesia employs deterrence through denial in line with the A2/AD approach. Indonesia's defense doctrine incorporates A2/AD principles through its layered defense strategy. The multi-layered defense system is designed to stop enemy forces from crossing into Indonesia's territorial borders<sup>94</sup>. As a country with a very limited defense budget, the A2/AD strategy is the most feasible and rational for Indonesia to implement<sup>95</sup>. Both the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) and the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) have developed and are developing military doctrines in line with the implementation of A2/AD<sup>96</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> Bjerga, Kjell Inge and Haaland, Torunn Laugen: "Development of Military Doctrine: The Particular Case of Small States." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, n° 4 (2010), pp. 505–33.; Høiback, Harald: "What Is Doctrine?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34, n° 6 (2011), pp. 879–900.

<sup>86</sup> Høiback, *op. cit.*; Kier, Elizabeth: "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars" *International Security*, Vol. 19, n° 4 (1995), pp. 65–93.

<sup>87</sup> Widjajanto, Andi: "Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia 1945-1998." *Prisma*, Vol. 29, n° 1 (2010), pp. 1–31.

<sup>88</sup> Sarjito, Aris: "Evaluating Indonesia's National Defense Policy in Shaping an Effective Area Denial Strategy" *Journal of Political Issues* Vol. 6, n° 2 (2025), pp. 124–34.

<sup>89</sup> Laksmana, Evan A: "Indonesia and Anti-Access Warfare: Preliminary Policy Thoughts" *Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. 48, n° 4 (2020), pp. 303–21.

<sup>90</sup> Colom-Piella, Guillem: "An A2/AD in the Western Mediterranean? Is Algeria Developing Anti-Access/Area-Denial Capabilities?" *Defense Studies*, Vol. 22, n° 1 (2022), pp. 60–78.; Tangredi, Sam J: "Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy: From Campaign Analyses to Assessment of Extrinsic Events." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 71, n° 1 (2018), pp. 33–52.

<sup>91</sup> Alcazar, Vincent: "Crisis Management and the Anti-Access/Area Denial Problem", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 6, n° 4 (2012), pp. 42–70.; Colom-Piella, *op. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> Widjajanto, Andi; Gindarsah, Iis; Triantama, Febry and Sabana, Dizar (2022): *Transformasi Perang Darat 2045: Studi Dan Proyeksi Operasi TNI AD*. Jakarta, Laboratorium Indonesia 2045.

<sup>93</sup> Laksmana, *Indonesia and Anti-Access Warfare: Preliminary Policy Thoughts, op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> Laksmana, Evan A: "The View from Jakarta", *Australian Foreign Affairs* Vol. 21 (2024), pp. 28–44.

<sup>95</sup> Matthews, Ron; Maharani, Curie.; Jupriyanto; and Wu, S. S: "Indonesia's defense acquisition strategy", *Asian Security*, Vol. 21, n° 2 (2025), pp. 125–148.

<sup>96</sup> Laksmana, Evan A: "Contingent Capabilities: Southeast Asia's Emerging Anti-access Environment", *IISS Research Papers*, February 2026, at <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2026/02/contingent-capabilities-southeast-asias-emerging-anti-access-environment/>



The successful implementation of A2/AD within Indonesia's defense doctrine needs to be accompanied by the acquisition of relevant military technologies. Several key military technologies are theoretically crucial for the successful implementation of A2/AD. The systems in question comprise radar systems, military satellites, missiles, and reconnaissance drones<sup>97</sup>. Notably, missiles have a significant role in A2/AD implementation, with certain types—such as Medium and Long-Range Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), Medium and Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), and Anti-Ship Missiles (AShM)—being particularly significant in the context<sup>98</sup>. In the application of A2/AD, these missiles allow Indonesia to launch precision strikes against the enemy's main forces before they are able to reach the combat zone<sup>99</sup>. The threat posed by missiles also increases the complexity of the enemy's naval combat power projection because they are under the shadow of AShM attacks<sup>100</sup>. But unfortunately, until now, Indonesia's missile capability is still limited to ensure the success of the A2/AD strategy.<sup>101</sup>

Besides implementing A2/AD, Indonesia's current defense doctrine is also inseparable from the concept of the Archipelagic Trident Shield (ATS). ATS is a concept for the long-term development of Indonesia's defense capabilities, which the Ministry of Defense began developing during Prabowo's tenure as Minister of Defense. In its implementation, the ATS is intended to enable Indonesia to optimise the interoperability of all branches of the military. In other words, in the future, Indonesia will no longer always rely on infantry strength but will also maximise the strength of the Navy and Air Force.<sup>102</sup> Through this ATS concept, the direction of Indonesia's defense posture development for at least the next 25 years is characterised by: (1) Emphasis on interoperability between branches of service and weaponry, (2) Acquisition of modern, high-impact weaponry technology, (3) Layered defense with force deployment prioritised in vulnerable areas, and (4) Domestic mastery of technology<sup>103</sup>.

This concept of ATS, which emphasises interoperability across domains, is also in line with Indonesia's implementation of A2/AD. This is because Anti-Access requires the simultaneous mobilisation of various weapon technologies across land, sea, and air domains<sup>104</sup>. For example, the use of air force radar in naval combat for launching AShM missiles from the coast or warships requires interoperability between branches and weapons systems.

Additionally, the concept of ATS in the development of Indonesia's defense posture further strengthens the urgency of missile ownership. Missiles have long been recognised as one of the modern weapons technologies and possess high deterrent power. In fact, it is

<sup>97</sup> Colom-Piella, *op. cit.*; Tangredi, *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> Simón, Luis: “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-Access’ Challenge”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, n° 3 (2016), pp. 417–45.; Colom-Piella, *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Lanoszka, Alexsander, and Hunzeker, Michael A.: “Confronting the anti-access/area denial and precision strike challenge in the Baltic region”, *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 161, n° 5 (2016), pp. 12–18.

<sup>100</sup> Dunley, Richard: “The End of the Age of Transoceanic Navies? Democratization of A2/AD and the Relationship Between Land and Sea Power”, *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 169, n° 4, pp. 54–62.

<sup>101</sup> Laksmana, *Contingent Capabilities: Southeast Asia's Emerging Anti-Access Environment, op. cit.*

<sup>102</sup> Matthews, R. et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>103</sup> IDM: “Pembekalan Ke Pasis, Menhan Paparkan Konsep Perisai Trisula Nusantara Dan Tekankan Postur Modern TNI”, *Indonesia Defense Magazine*, 27 November 2025, at <https://indonesiadefense.com/pembekalan-ke-pasis-menhan-paparkan-konsep-perisai-trisula-nusantara-dan-tekanan-postur-modern-tni/>; IDM: “Susunan Kekuatan ‘Perisai Samudra Nusantara’ Oleh Menhan Prabowo Untuk TNI AL”, *Indonesia Defense Magazine*, 29 June 2023, at <https://indonesiadefense.com/susunan-kekuatan-perisai-samudra-nusantara-oleh-menhan-prabowo-untuk-tni-al/>; Nababan, Willy Medi Christian: “HUT TNI Dan Evolusi Strategi Pertahanan Nusantara”, *Kompas.id*, 5 October 2025, at [https://www.kompas.id/artikel/hut-tni-dan-evolusi-strategi-pertahanan-nusantara?open\\_from=Search\\_Result\\_Page](https://www.kompas.id/artikel/hut-tni-dan-evolusi-strategi-pertahanan-nusantara?open_from=Search_Result_Page).

<sup>104</sup> Laksmana, *Indonesia and Anti-Access Warfare: Preliminary Policy Thoughts, op. cit.*



projected that missiles will become even more of a mainstay for the country in the future<sup>105</sup>. Conventional (non-nuclear) missiles are even believed to provide more credible deterrence than nuclear missiles because the likelihood of their use is greater than that of nuclear missiles<sup>106</sup>. The capabilities offered by the missile align with the characteristics of Indonesia's defense force development through the ATS concept, as previously mentioned. This is also reflected in the statement made by Prabowo when he was still serving as Minister of Defense, introducing the ATS concept. In his statement, Prabowo highlighted the range of Indonesia's SSM missiles, which can reach several neighbouring countries such as Singapore, Australia, and the Philippines when deployed at Indonesia's outermost points. At the same time, Prabowo also stated that in the ATS concept, Indonesian fighter jets and warships will be equipped with missiles with a range of 120 – 180 kilometres.<sup>107</sup>

#### **4. Indonesia Willingness to Procure Türkiye's Missiles: It's Missile Era**

According to previous discussion in this article, Indonesia aims to significantly enhance its defense capabilities through the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) are implementing a comprehensive strengthened defense position through the MEF, with each branch targeting specific and varying objectives based on its unique requirements. The objective in relation to the TNI AL modernisation requirements is to achieve a green water navy status and to establish an Integrated Fleet System by the year 2024, which will be a major milestone in the country's defense development<sup>108</sup>. TNI AL's planned acquisition portfolio includes a diverse range of assets such as submarine fleets, frigate-class combat vessels, patrol boats, aircraft, and helicopters, which will significantly bolster the navy's military power. By 2024, the TNI AL is expected to boast 12 submarine fleets and 56 frigate-class combat vessels, demonstrating a substantial increase in its naval capabilities<sup>109</sup>. The MEF program also sets up 10-12 squadrons of fighter planes for the TNI AU, in addition to purchasing fighter aircraft to bolster combat squadron capabilities, upgrading transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, radar systems, and air defense systems, which will further enhance the air force's combat effectiveness<sup>110</sup>.

The defense posture development targets set for the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) program are explicitly outlined in Indonesia's National Defense Policy document, issued by the Ministry of Defense through Ministerial Regulation No. 1 of 2022. This document specifies Indonesia's defense posture priorities, including the development of an integrated defense structure and the acquisition of various defense technologies such as frigates, submarines, and radar systems. However, one particular defense technology is prioritized across all services of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI): missiles<sup>111</sup>.

Missiles play a crucial role in the defense posture development of all three military services. The Indonesian Army (TNI AD) aims to enhance its defense posture for the 2020–2024 period by deploying surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) across major islands such as Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan. The Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) is strengthening its capabilities by

<sup>105</sup> Dunley, *op. cit.*

<sup>106</sup> Chase, Michel S., & Erickson, Andrew S.: “The conventional missile capabilities of China's second artillery force: Cornerstone of deterrence and Warfighting”, *Asian Security*, Vol. 8, n° 2 (2012), pp. 115–137.

<sup>107</sup> IDM, *Pembekalan Ke Pasis, Menhan Paparkan Konsep Perisai Trisula Nusantara Dan Tekankan Postur Modern TNI*, *op. cit.*; IDM, *Susunan Kekuatan 'Perisai Samudra Nusantara' Oleh Menhan Prabowo Untuk TNI AL*, *op. cit.*

<sup>108</sup> Collin, *op. cit.*; Dzikri, *op. cit.*; Widjajanto, Andi; Prasetyono, Edy and Keliat, Makmur (2012): *Dinamika Persenjataan Dan Revitalisasi Industri Pertahanan*, Depok, UI Press,

<sup>109</sup> Collin, *op. cit.*; Widjajanto, et al., *Dinamika Persenjataan Dan Revitalisasi Industri Pertahanan*, *op. cit.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> Permenhan RI No.1 Tahun 2022 Tentang Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2022”, at <https://www.kemhan.go.id/strahan/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/JAKHANNEG-2022.pdf>



acquiring warships equipped with anti-ship missiles (ASMs) with a minimum range of 150 km, as well as medium- and long-range SAMs. For the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU), the role of missiles is even more critical. The same document states that TNI AU prioritizes the acquisition of medium- and long-range air defense missiles<sup>112</sup> (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022). Additionally, Indonesia's missile requirements include deployment in strategic locations, such as key straits along the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ALKI)<sup>113</sup>, as well as forming an air defense shield for the new capital, Nusantara (IKN)<sup>114</sup>.

The relocation of Indonesia's capital to IKN necessitates the realignment of TNI's force deployment, as IKN will serve as the new Center of Gravity (CoG) and must be optimally secured<sup>115</sup>. Geographically, IKN is in close proximity to several high-risk areas and potential conflict zones. It is near the Indonesia–Malaysia border, the Makassar Strait choke point, ALKI II, and the South China Sea. Besides geographic threats, IKN is also within the range of ballistic missiles and strategic bombers from both China and the United States<sup>116</sup>. Andi Widjanto, in his capacity as Governor of the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), emphasized that airspace threats pose the greatest risk to IKN's security<sup>117</sup>.

To safeguard IKN as the CoG, the government and TNI have developed the "Smart Defense" strategy, which integrates military and non-military defense elements while leveraging technological advancements<sup>118</sup>. This Smart Defense strategy is complemented by the implementation of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to ensure IKN's security. As previously mentioned, missiles play a central role in both Smart Defense and A2/AD strategies. This is evident in plans to deploy medium-range air defense missiles and point-defense systems around IKN<sup>119</sup>. In addition to air defense missiles, Indonesia also plans to deploy coastal defense missile systems<sup>120</sup>. The Indonesian Deputy Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs even stated that Indonesia must abandon outdated defense doctrines, as missile technology has transformed modern warfare<sup>121</sup>.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> "Gubernur Lemhannas RI: Kerawanan Utama Ibu Kota Baru Adalah Ruang Udara", Lemhannas RI, 17 March 2022, at [https://www.lemhannas.go.id/index.php/berita/berita-utama/1432-gubernur-;](https://www.lemhannas.go.id/index.php/berita/berita-utama/1432-gubernur-) Purnama, Azura Yumna Ramadani: "Lodewijk Ungkap Prioritas Pertahanan IKN: Sekarang Era Rudal." *Bloomberg Technoz*, 21 October 2024, at <https://www.bloombergentechnoz.com/detail-news/52536/lodewijk-ungkap-prioritas-pertahanan-ikn-sekarang-era-rudal/2>.

<sup>115</sup> Fuady, Ian: "Strategi Sistem Pertahanan Ibu Kota Nusantara Sebagai Central of Gravity Negara Guna Meningkatkan Ketahanan Nasional", *Kertas Karya Ilmiah Perseorangan*, (August 2024), at <http://lib.lemhannas.go.id/public/media/catalog/0010-092400000000061/swf/7833/048%20-%20Ian%20Fuady.pdf>.

<sup>116</sup> Harianja, Axel Joshua Halomoan Raja: "IKN Rentan Serangan Udara, Perkuat Mitigasi Dan Sistem Persenjataan", *Kompas.id*, 2 November 2022, at [https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2022/11/02/ikn-rawan-serangan-udara-perkuat-mitigasi-dan-alutsista?loc=hard\\_paywall](https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2022/11/02/ikn-rawan-serangan-udara-perkuat-mitigasi-dan-alutsista?loc=hard_paywall;).; Saputra, Andi: "Gubernur Lemhannas Ungkap Kawasan IKN Rawan Serangan Militer", *Detiknews*, 12 May 2022, at <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6075069/gubernur-lemhannas-ungkap-kawasan-ikn-rawan-serangan-militer>.; Widjanto, Andi: "Pertahanan Ibu Kota Negara", *Lemhannas RI*, 2 March 2023, at [https://www.lemhannas.go.id/images/2023/Materi\\_KUP/0203\\_Seminar\\_Nasional\\_Unjani.pdf](https://www.lemhannas.go.id/images/2023/Materi_KUP/0203_Seminar_Nasional_Unjani.pdf).

<sup>117</sup> Lemhannas RI, *op. cit.*

<sup>118</sup> BRIN: "Waka BRIN Ingatkan Pentingnya Smart Air Defense Dan Smart Cyber Defense Di IKN, Ini Alasannya!", *BRIN*, 6 March 2024, at <https://brin.go.id/news/117766/waka-brin-ingatkan-pentingnya-smart-air-defense-dan-smart-cyber-defense-di-ikn-ini-alasannya>.

<sup>119</sup> Fuady, *op. cit.*; Permenhan RI No.1 Tahun 2022 Tentang Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2022, *op. cit.*; Purnama, *op. cit.*

<sup>120</sup> Saputra, Alex Aji: "Urgensi, Konsepsi Dan Implementasi Benteng Pertahanan IKN", *Sindonews*, 12 August 2024, at <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1433553/16/urgensi-konsepsi-dan-implementasi-benteng-pertahanan-ikn-1723385292/50>.

<sup>121</sup> Purnama, *op. cit.*



Recognizing the strategic importance of missile systems, the Indonesian government has designated missiles as a priority program within the national defense industry. According to Presidential Regulation No. 8 of 2021, Indonesia's ten priority defense industry programs include fighter jets, submarines, propellants, rockets, guided missiles, radar systems, military satellites, medium tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and underwater surveillance systems (KKIP, 2024). The prioritization of missile development aligns with Indonesia's broader defense posture strategy, as the country seeks to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and achieve defense industry self-sufficiency. Consequently, all defense technologies must, to the greatest extent possible, be procured domestically<sup>122</sup>.

However, despite the mandate to prioritize domestically produced defense technology, TNI is still permitted to import weapon systems under specific conditions. Article 43, paragraph 5 of Law No. 16 of 2012 on the Defense Industry (Defense Industry Law) allows for the import of defense technology provided that certain conditions are met. These conditions include (1) mandatory technology transfer, (2) the involvement of local defense industries, and (3) offset agreements<sup>123</sup>. Defense Industry Law also explicitly requires guarantees against potential embargoes and political conditionalities in any defense procurement:

"Guarantees must be provided to ensure the absence of potential embargoes, political conditionalities, and restrictions on the use of defense and security equipment for the purpose of defending the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation from threats and disruptions to national unity and security".

## 5. Discussion: Why Turkish Made Missile Then?

Before presenting the main argument of this study, it is necessary to emphasize several key findings discussed in the previous sections. First, despite ending three decades ago, the Cold War continues to have a significant impact on the current international political constellation. The dissolution of the Soviet threat for NATO member states, including Türkiye, has led to a decline in the alliance's internal cohesion. This is because defense alliances like NATO are fundamentally built on a shared perception of threats<sup>124</sup>. When this shared perception dissipates, the alliance risks losing one of its key binding factors. While NATO persists today, its survival is largely driven by pragmatic interests, including economic benefits. However, when these benefits are no longer perceived as significant, states may pursue alternative or even revisionist policies. Schweller (1994) refers to this phenomenon as bandwagoning for profit, a strategy that has also been attributed to Türkiye<sup>125</sup>.

As previously discussed, Ankara has expressed dissatisfaction with its treatment by Global North countries, which have long been Türkiye's closest partners. Türkiye no longer believes that loyalty to the United States or NATO will effectively serve its national interests. This is evident in two key cases: NATO's reluctance to play a more active role in resolving the Syrian conflict because Syria was an "out of area" conflict and Türkiye's repeated failures to

<sup>122</sup> Triantama, Febry (2023): "Quo Vadis Industri Pertahanan Nasional: Urgensi Liberalisasi Dan Rekalibrasi Visi Pembangunan Industri Pertahanan", in *Refleksi Politik Internasional Kontemporer Gatot Subroto Kav. 97*, Malang, PT. Literasi Nusantara Abadi Grup, pp. 1–24.; Prihandoko, Reine; Triantama, Febry; Wahyudi, Aditya Haryo and Priamarizki, Adhi (2023): *Optimasi Industri Pertahanan Nasional Guna Mendorong Transformasi Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta, Laboratorium Indonesia 2045.

<sup>123</sup> UU No. 16 Tahun 2012 Tentang Industri Pertahanan, at <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/39088/uu-no-16-tahun-2012>

<sup>124</sup> Walt, Stephen (1987): *The Origins of Alliances*, New York, Cornell University Press.

<sup>125</sup> Litsas, Spyridon N: "Bandwagoning for Profit and Turkey: Alliance Formations and Volatility in the Middle East", *Israel Affairs*, Vol 20 (2014), pp. 125–139.



gain accession to the European Union <sup>126</sup>. This is because of concerns over Turkey's democratic backsliding and poor respect for human rights, as well as opposition from Greece and Cyprus due to deep-seated animosity stemming from Turkey's territorial and maritime claims. Following the bandwagoning for profit rationale, Türkiye perceives that its close ties with the Global North no longer provide sufficient benefits aligned with its national interests.

Second, based on these considerations and frustrations, Türkiye has recalibrated its foreign policy vision, intensifying cooperation with Asian states. Türkiye introduced the Asia Anew Initiative, a strategic geopolitical move reflecting the shifting Center of Gravity in global politics from the Transatlantic region to Asia. As Türkiye aspires to become a major power in international politics, it recognizes that such an ambition is unattainable without strong partnerships and significant influence in Asia <sup>127</sup>

Third, Indonesia, which is actively modernizing and strengthening its defense posture, views missile capability as a critical necessity. The importance of missile acquisition is evident in various official government documents and statements by Indonesian political elites. This necessity is closely linked to the adoption of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy in Indonesia's defense doctrine. Similar to other states implementing A2/AD strategies, such as China, Indonesia considers medium- and long-range cruise and ballistic missiles as essential weapon systems <sup>128</sup>. Moreover, Indonesia's ongoing capital relocation from Jakarta to Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN) further underscores the need for enhanced A2/AD capabilities, particularly through the acquisition of Medium/Long-Range SAM, Medium/Long-Range SSM, and Medium/Long-Range ASHM.

These three key findings form the foundation of the main argument presented in this article. As outlined in the analytical framework, a state's decision to select a supplier for defense technology is influenced by two factors: (1) opportunity, arising from structural conditions such as geopolitical dynamics, and (2) willingness, originating from domestic considerations. This study argues that Indonesia's bold decision to become the first international buyer of Türkiye's three missile systems was driven by the convergence of opportunity and willingness.

This convergence can be observed in at least four aspects. First, despite the deterioration of Türkiye's relations with the United States and NATO, Türkiye remains part of the alliance. This means that Indonesia is not at risk of facing Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions for purchasing missiles from Türkiye. At the same time, this decision helps Indonesia avoid excessive dependence on U.S. defense technology, aligning with its goal of strengthening its defense posture.

Second, the convergence of opportunity and willingness is also evident in the differences in arms technology transfer policies. Traditional defense technology suppliers, such as the United States, often impose political conditions or the threat of embargoes on arms sales. In contrast, Türkiye has thus far adopted a no-restrictions policy. This approach aligns with Indonesia's preference for unrestricted technology transfers in arms procurement, as stipulated in Article 43, Paragraph 5 of the National Defense Industry Law.

Third, Türkiye, in its effort to expand its influence in Asia and gaining access to Asian market, has demonstrated a strong commitment to technology transfer in defense transactions. In Indonesia's case, this commitment is evident in various instances. As previously mentioned, Indonesia and Türkiye have a positive track record of defense industrial cooperation, including the development of the Harimau/Kaplan Medium Battle Tank and the production of border

<sup>126</sup> Fidan, *op. cit.*; Roy-Mukherjee and Udeogu, *op. cit.*

<sup>127</sup> Yeşiltaş, *op. cit.*

<sup>128</sup> Colom-Piella, *op. cit.*; Simón, *op. cit.*



surveillance radars. This is different compared to the less-than-stellar track record of defense industry cooperation between Indonesia and China, which followed the less-than-optimal performance of the C-705 missile that was initially intended to be produced in Indonesia under license.<sup>129</sup> In the context of Turkish missile acquisition, Türkiye's defense company Roketsan has officially signed a joint venture agreement with Indonesia's Republikorp to establish a missile production facility in Indonesia<sup>130</sup>. This initiative aligns with Indonesia's objective of developing its national defense industry to achieve autarky, particularly as missile technology is a priority in Indonesia's defense industry development.

Fourth, the missile systems procured from Türkiye—namely the HISAR-O medium-range SAM, the Atmaca AShM, and the Bora long-range SSM—align with Indonesia's defense doctrine. As highlighted earlier, the implementation of the A2/AD strategy necessitates the acquisition of medium- and long-range missiles. The HISAR-O medium-range SAM can intercept aerial threats at altitudes of up to 15 kilometers and ranges of 40 kilometers from the launch point. It can also be deployed across multiple platforms, including UCAVs, naval vessels, and land vehicles, as well as in coastal defense operations<sup>131</sup>. The Atmaca AShM is a sea-skimming anti-ship missile comparable to the AGM-84 Harpoon, which is already in service with the Indonesian military. With a range of up to 250 kilometers, the Atmaca enhances Indonesia's maritime strike capabilities<sup>132</sup>. The Bora long-range SSM, on the other hand, boasts a range of 280 kilometers<sup>133</sup>. These three missile systems—each with medium- to long-range capabilities—are integral to Indonesia's implementation of the A2/AD strategy, a core component of its defense doctrine.

## 6. Conclusion

Indonesia has taken a bold step in procuring defense technology, particularly in the latest phase of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) program spanning 2019–2024. During this period, Indonesia acquired Medium/Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), Medium/Long-Range Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), and Medium/Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (AShM), all of which were manufactured by Türkiye. This marks Indonesia's first-ever procurement of Turkish-made missiles and simultaneously establishes Indonesia as the first buyer of these systems outside Türkiye. Indonesia's decision to pursue this policy was driven by the convergence of structural opportunities in the international system and Indonesia's own willingness. The shifting international political landscape following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new global centers of gravity created structural opportunities. Meanwhile, Indonesia's need to acquire missile systems, its implementation of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies, and its aspiration for defense autarky constitute the key elements of willingness discussed in this article.

Although this article provides an explanation for Indonesia's decision to procure missiles from Türkiye, the author argues that further research is necessary. While there are strong rationales behind Indonesia's acquisition of various Turkish-made missile systems, it is essential to assess whether this decision was indeed appropriate. In particular, it is crucial to

<sup>129</sup> Sucipto: "Cerita KSAL hingga Panglima TNI Panik, Rudal Buatan China yang Ditembakkan Jokowi Tak Meledak", *Sindonews*, 27 September 2023, at <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1211241/14/cerita-ksal-hingga-panglima-tni-panik-rudal-buatan-china-yang-ditembakkan-jokowi-tak-meledak-1695769791>; Rini Utami Oleg: "Upaya alih teknologi pertahanan Indonesia-China", *ANTARA News*, 15 January 2014, at <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/414159/upaya-alih-teknologi-pertahanan-indonesia-china>.

<sup>130</sup> TURDEF. "Indonesia Joins Forces with Turkish Defense Firms", *TURDEF*, 12 February 2025, at <https://turdef.com/article/indonesia-joins-forces-with-turkish-defense-firms>.

<sup>131</sup> HISAR Air Defense Missiles, at <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/en/products/hisar-air-defense-missiles>.

<sup>132</sup> ATMACA Anti-Ship Missile, at <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/en/products/atmaca-anti-ship-missile>.

<sup>133</sup> KHAN Missile, at <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/en/products/khan-missile>



examine issues of interoperability with Indonesia's existing weapon systems and whether the addition of another missile supplier could potentially lead to a logistical and maintenance nightmare, the budgetary constraints, and the AWACS deficit, leaving a critical gap in its ability to manage a modern A2/AD environment.

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